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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BYSTANDERS IN THE
WAR ON CRIME
ROGER W. KIRST*
[W]itnesses ... saw a Merrionette Park police officer shoot at a fleeing car but
gun down an innocent bystander instead .... I
[Tlhe Philadelphia neighborhood [was] where 270 people were left homeless
last week in the fire that followed the police confrontation with the radical
group MOVE .... 2
Statewide, 18 people were killed and 937 injured last year in car crashes
resulting from 6,385 pursuits by law enforcement agencies, according to the
California Highway Patrol.3
[Tihe Branch Davidian compound burned to the ground, leaving an estimated
17 children among the dead .... '

Police efforts to combat crime can have tragic consequences for bystanders
caught in the middle. A tragic outcome does not necessarily mean the police
response was improper. A suspect's criminal conduct might have been dangerous
already. The result might have been worse if the officers had responded differently
or not at all. Even with the best response, a suspect's flight or resistance may
magnify the danger and be an obvious cause of all the harm. Despite these caveats,

some tragedies also raise doubts about either the wisdom or the execution of the
police response. Some bystanders may have a tort claim under state law that

imposes liability for police negligence5 or even absolute liability, 6 but in other states
bystanders have little chance of winning a tort action against either an officer or

police department.7 The question answered in this article is whether a police
response can violate the constitutional rights of bystanders and create a federal civil

rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983).
This question and answer are important well beyond their specific focus. The
circuit courts assumed that substantive due process would provide the answer and
have spent a decade trying to define the standard for determining whether there is
a substantive due process claim.' In a parallel development the circuit courts
* Henry M. Grether Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Research for this article was
supported by a grant from the McCollum Research Fund at the University of Nebraska College of Law. I am grateful
for the research assistance of Mark Privratsky, Class of 1996, and the critique of my ideas and drafts by my
colleague, Professor Josephine Potuto.
1. Jerry Shnay, Chicagoland,CHICAGO TRiB., Nov. 15, 1990, at 22.
2. What's News Worldwide, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1985, at 1.
3. Yvonne Chiu, Police Chief Defends Deadly Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, April 9, 1997, at Al.
4. Gustav Niebuhr & Pierre Thomas, Abuse Allegations Unproven; Koresh Was Investigated In Texas,
California,WASHINGTON POST, April 25, 1993, at Al.
5. See, e.g., City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1992).
6. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-911 (Cum. Supp. 1996); see also Stewart v. City of Omaha, 494 N.W.2d
130 (Neb. 1993).
7. See, e.g., Billester v. City of Corona, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121 (Ct. App. 1994); Bryant v. County of Los
Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285 (Ct. App. 1994); Dickens v. Homer, 611 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1992); McLenahan v.
Lawhorne, 849 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Boveri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4 (1st Cit. 1997); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir.
1996); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994);
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assumed that some targets of a police response should have a similar substantive
due process claim if they are injured. 9 In both types of cases a common
denominator was often that the police were involved in a high speed pursuit at the
time either the bystander or a target was injured. Lewis v. Sacramento County,'° a
case in which a death occurred during a pursuit, provides the context for the
Supreme Court's first review of the substantive due process answer. The primary
issue has been described as a choice of the standard for this claim:
(1) In police pursuit case, is legal standard of conduct necessary to establish
violation of substantive due process under Fourteenth Amendment "shocks the
conscience" test, as determined by this court in Collins v. HarkerHeights, 503
U.S. 115 (1992) and other circuit court cases, or is standard "deliberate
indifference" or "reckless disregard," as determined by the Ninth Circuit in
this case?"
It might appear that the stage is set for the Court to resolve a conflict among the
circuit courts on a question they have properly framed and thoroughly explored.
That appearance is false on both counts.
The real lesson of the circuit courts' struggle to find an answer for bystander
rights in the mysteries of substantive due process is that they spent the whole time
looking in the wrong place. Their task was not easy, because they had to construct
an answer that would fill gaps left by the Supreme Court in opinions that gave
ambiguous signals to the circuit courts or left important issues unresolved.
However, the results now in hand make it clear that substantive due process is not
the answer that will be most consistent with section 1983 jurisprudence. A primary
reason is that the circuit courts have ignored the Supreme Court's emphasis on
organizing constitutional rights under an explicit textual source.' 2 A better answer
for the rights of anyone injured by a police officer's response to a crime could have
been based on the Fourth Amendment, but the circuit courts too readily assumed
this foundation was not available. Therefore, the Supreme Court should decline the
invitation in Lewis to pick a winner among the labels for a substantive due process
violation. The Court should instead use the circuit courts' search for bystander
rights as a case study of how constitutional doctrine evolved based on the outline
it sketched but left incomplete in its earlier decisions. From this case study, the
Court can learn where and how it should more fully define the sources and scope
of the constitutional rights that can be enforced in section 1983 litigation.

Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340 (10th Cit. 1994); Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cit. 1992);
Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278 (4th Ci. 1991); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716 (4th

Cir. 1991); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Ci. 1987). See generally Alpert, Clark & Smith, The Constitutional
Implications of High-Speed Police Pursuits Under a Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis: HomewardThrough the

Haze, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 599 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251 (10th Ci. 1994); Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719 (11th
Cir. 1993).
10. 98 F.3d 434 (9th Ci. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997).
11. Petition for Certiorari, Lewis v. Sacramento County, 65 U.S.LW. 3650 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1997) (No. 961337).
12. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989));
id. at 281 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 288-89 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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In order to bring out the story of the circuit courts' search for bystander rights
it is necessary both to step back to describe the overall picture that is lost when
issues are examined in isolation and to trace the threads of interrelated bodies of
doctrine. Part I of this Article summarizes the setting in which the circuit courts
searched for bystander rights. Part II describes how the circuit court decisions
found their substantive due process answer for bystanders and extended it to some
other targets of a police response. Part III first describes the Supreme Court's
development of the Fourth Amendment right against excessive force and then
explores how ambiguities and gaps in the Court's decisions became apparent in the
search for bystander rights. Part IV examines how radically some circuit courts
reconstructed their substantive due process answer when it did not seem to provide
an adequate foundation for addressing a police department's duty to train and
supervise its officers. Part V suggests what lessons can be learned from the circuit
courts' exploration of substantive due process, while Part VI sketches the
opportunity Lewis now provides to apply those lessons.
I.

A SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS' ANSWERS

Suspects and Bystanders
The only two elements of a section 1983 claim are that the defendant acted
"under color of state law" and "deprive[d] another of rights protected by the
Constitution."13 The color of state law element was present in all the cases, so the
disputed issue became whether bystanders have any rights protected by the
Constitution. There was little chance that injured bystanders might find any
constitutional right until the Supreme Court held that criminal suspects could
recover damages from the police under section 1983.
Three decisions held that police officers violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
suspects when they respond with excessive force. In Tennessee v. Garner4 the
Court held that officers violate the Fourth Amendment if they use unreasonable
force in trying to detain or arrest a suspect. The decision allowed the survivor of
a fleeing suspect shot by an officer to recover damages for the constitutional
violation in a section 1983 civil rights action. In Brower v. County of Inyo"5 the
Court held that this Fourth Amendment right protects suspects fleeing from a police
pursuit. In Graham v. Connor 6 it held that the Fourth Amendment protects a
suspect from all excessive force, whether deadly or nondeadly. However, no
Supreme Court decision has addressed how the Constitution protects bystanders,
or whether bystanders have any constitutional rights at all.
Shortly after the Supreme Court established that suspects have a Fourth
Amendment right, circuit courts began to consider whether bystanders injured by
a police response would also have a constitutional claim. Several circuit court
decisions suggested bystanders injured during a high speed police pursuit could sue
A.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
489 U.S. 593 (1989).
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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the officers under section 1983 by asserting a substantive due process right under
the Fourteenth Amendment. These early decisions described two different standards
for the substantive due process right. The Third, 7 Fourth18 and Sixth19 Circuits assumed there would be a violation of substantive due process if the officer's conduct
"shocks the conscience" of the court. The Tenth Circuit concluded a violation of
substantive due process occurred when an officer acted with "reckless indifference"
to the risk of injuring bystanders.' In later decisions the conscience shocking
standard became the norm as the Tenth Circuit tried to adopt that position,21 the
2
First Circuit adopted it explicitly, ' and the Seventh Circuit adopted it implicitly.
However, these circuit court decisions did not mean success for injured
bystanders. To the contrary, any hope that bystanders could recover damages from
the police for a substantive due process violation had to be tempered by the uniform
result of every case. No bystander plaintiff recovered damages in any of the cases
under either standard for a substantive due process claim. A summary judgment for
defendants was sustained even in a case where a bystander was severely injured by
police conduct that an expert witness testified was "'reckless,' 'totally
irresponsible,' and 'wanton'" and that the court labeled as "disturbing and lacking
in judgment."'24 In reality substantive due process provided bystanders with not even
a fraction of the right that could be asserted under the Fourth Amendment by a
suspect who triggered a police response.
One short explanation for the difference between the constitutional rights of
bystanders and suspects is timing. By the time bystander claims reached the circuit
courts, the Supreme Court was well along in its effort to set limits on the scope of
section 1983 claims. Supreme Court decisions made it clear that section 1983 does
not provide a remedy for every wrong committed by a government worker, 25 and
that "'it is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'"26 Suspects had the advantage
of better timing, because their Fourth Amendment rights were central to some of
the decisions that set those limits. Graham v. Connor2' was a landmark case on
limits with its holding that section 1983 did not create a generic claim for excessive
force' while it further defined the Fourth Amendment right of suspects established

17. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994).
18. See Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Temkin v. Frederick County
Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Ci. 1991).
19. See Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Ci. 1987).
20. See Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Ci. 1994); see, e.g., Medina v. City of Denver, 960
F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992).
21. See Williams v. City of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Ci. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
March 3, 1997, as noted in Rowe v. City of Marlow. Nos. 96-6144, 96-6229, 1997 WL 353001, at *5 n.7 (10th Ci.
June 26, 1997).
22. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (1st Ci. 1996).
23. See Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. Temkin, 945 F.2d at 723.
25. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992).
26. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
27. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
28. See id. at 393-94.
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four years earlier in Garner.29 Brower v. County of Inyo3' was a case that held that
the Fourth Amendment right protected fleeing suspects, and a case that emphasized
that the Fourth Amendment would not protect suspects unless they were actually
"seized" by the police. In contrast, no Supreme Court opinion even suggested
where bystanders might find the specific constitutional right the Court would
require to sustain a section 1983 claim.
The sequence and holdings of the Court's decisions made it appear that
substantive due process was the strongest possible candidate that might provide a
constitutional right for bystanders. However, there were reasons to doubt the
viability of a claim based on substantive due process from the start. The Court had
held that substantive due process did not provide the specific constitutional right
that would protect either victims of third party violence3' or injured city workers.32
The Court opinions stated an express caution against developing constitutional
rights under the substantive due process standard where the "guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce and open-ended"3 3 and advised that
constitutional rights should be based on an explicit textual source when one is
available.3 4 In this setting it is not surprising that the circuit court decisions
compromised by neither following nor explicitly rejecting the Court's caution to
avoid substantive due process and its advice to rely on an explicit textual source.
Instead, the circuit court decisions created a symbolic constitutional right by
suggesting that a substantive due process claim is possible but at the same time
setting the standard higher than any plaintiff could prove.
The Impact of Lewis v. Sacramento County 35
The Ninth Circuit demonstrated that the substantive due process right could
become more than symbolic by doing no more than reversing a summary judgment
for the defendants in Lewis. 36 The opinion reviewed what other circuit courts had
held in pursuit cases and characterized its main task as defining the standard of
conduct for law enforcement officers "in the context of high-speed vehicular
pursuits."37 While the Ninth Circuit defined its standard as "deliberate indifference
or reckless disregard"3 1 instead of "shocks the conscience," the label is less
important than the result. By allowing a plaintiff to go to trial against an officer
who was pursuing too fast with little visibility and no good reason for starting a
pursuit at all, the decision showed the potential power of the substantive due
process claim. If other judges are more often shocked by a high speed pursuit or
permit juries to decide if an officer was deliberately indifferent, bystander claims
could lead to very close scrutiny of police operations.
B.

29. See id. at 395.
30. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
31.
32.

See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serws., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
See Collins, 503 U.S. at 126.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 125.
See id.
98 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997).
See id. at 439.
Id.
Id. at 441.
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The possibility that substantive due process claims might reach trial has
magnified the complexity of the constitutional limits facing police officers and
police departments. Since the officers cannot know in advance who might be
injured by their response, they must anticipate that each response might be judged
under either the Fourth Amendment or substantive due process, or both. If a
vehicle or building contains both suspects and others not suspected of any crime,
two distinct and not necessarily consistent constitutional rights will only complicate
the choice of a proper response. A police department's leaders must now take into
account that every officer's response to criminal activity could harm either suspects
or bystanders. As a result, they must also assume that each policy decision
regarding training or supervision might later be judged according to two distinct
and not necessarily consistent bodies of law. Each decision may be judged under
the Fourth Amendment if a suspect is harmed by excessive force and under the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a bystander is
harmed.
The facts in Lewis illustrate how selecting the applicable constitutional right can
become complicated. The victim in Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle being
pursued by the officer. 39 The passenger was not a complete bystander, but neither
was he suspected of any crime at the start of the pursuit nor was he guilty of the
traffic violations committed by the driver during the pursuit; still, the circumstances
made him a target of the officer's pursuit.' ° The Ninth Circuit was one of a number
of circuits that had concluded that a target of a pursuit could not assert a Fourth
Amendment claim under Brower if the harm at the end of the pursuit did not match
the facts of that case. " However, the circuit courts had paired that interpretation
of Brower with a holding that such targets could assert the substantive due process
right found in the bystander cases because "in the non-seizure, non-prisoner
context, the substantive due process right to be free from excessive force is alive
and well." 2 That precedent allowed the plaintiff in Lewis to assert a substantive due
process claim instead of a Fourth Amendment claim. Of course the outcome that
determined which claim would apply was unknown at the start of the pursuit.
The Ninth Circuit did not consider whether a conflict might develop between the
rules that would be used to evaluate a police response under either substantive due
process or the Fourth Amendment. There would be little chance of a conflict if the
courts had continued to reject all substantive due process claims, but a decision like
Lewis was only a matter of time. Other recent decisions on closely related issues
had suggested the potential scope of the substantive due process claim. The Tenth
Circuit's conscience was shocked when an officer who was not engaged in any
pursuit or emergency trip ran a red light on a major Denver boulevard with no siren
and crashed into another car.43 The conscience of a trial judge in the same circuit
was shocked when an officer allowed a suspect to wrestle away his gun and shoot

39. See id. at436.
40. See id.at 437.
41. See, e.g., Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1993); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th
Cir. 1993); Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1990).
42. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1995).
43. See Williams v. City of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
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a third person trying to assist the officer." That judge candidly admitted that the
finding of a substantive due process violation rested on "idiosyncratic" judgment
under an "amorphous and subjective standard [that] easily lends itself to resultoriented decisions,"' a description that emphasizes how even the most rigorous
measure of substantive due process can be open-ended in practice.
Substantive Due Process and Police DepartmentLiability
A critical test of the foundation for any basic doctrine comes when it must be
extended to address additional issues. For injured bystanders, a major new issue
will be whether they can assert a claim under section 1983 against the police
department. A local entity like a city or its police department is not liable under tort
principles for constitutional violations committed by its employees, but it will be
liable if the violation is caused by an official policy that is the product of deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.' For a suspect, the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from excessive force means that a police department has some duty to
train, supervise, and equip its officers to perform their job within constitutional
limits.4 If bystanders have only a substantive due process right to be free from
conduct that shocks the conscience of the court, it may be impossible for a
department to be deliberately indifferent to such a slight duty. Training intended to
protect the officer or to avoid violating the Fourth Amendment rights of suspects
would have enough of an incidental effect to keep the department from being
deliberately indifferent to bystanders, even if that training ignored a substantial
known risk to bystanders.
In one of the leading decisions on a city's constitutional duty to bystanders, the
Third Circuit did not follow this logic to its conclusion. Its en banc holding that a
bystander can establish a substantive due process violation only if the police
response shocks the judicial conscience was expressly limited to the claim against
the individual officers." The en banc court left intact a panel holding that the same
facts supported a viable claim against the city.49 Because the panel was bound by
the holding that the plaintiffs could not prove that the individual officers had
committed a constitutional violation, it concluded that the city could be liable if the
deliberate indifference of its policymakers "caused the officers to conduct the
pursuit in an unsafe manner. "I The effect of this holding created a constitutional
duty to prevent city employees from causing harm that is not a constitutional
violation. That result appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's position in cases
such as Collins and DeShaney that an action that imposes or ignores risk does not
create section 1983 liability unless the action violates a constitutional right.5 1 As a
C.

44. See Radecki v. Barela, 945 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.M. 1996).
45. Id. at 230.
46. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
47. See Zuchel v. City of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1993).
48. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d. Cir. 1994) (en banc decision).
49. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1994) (panel decision).
50. Id. at 1292.
51. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
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result, the message that a police department should train its officers to respect the
rights of the public rests on an unstable foundation.
There are other indications that defining the rights of bystanders under
substantive due process will be inconsistent with core ideas of section 1983
doctrine. Examples in the circuit court decisions suggested that substantive due
process would protect bystanders injured by an officer's "abuse of official power"52
or "'oppressive' abuse of governmental power"53 or "arbitrary use of government
power."' That effort to emphasize the limited scope of this claim appears directly
contrary to the Court's holding in Collins that firmly rejected the argument that an
"abuse of government power" should be an element of a section 1983 claim.55 The
Court there reaffirmed that section 1983 "does not draw any distinction between
abusive and nonabusive federal violations."56 Other circuit court opinions have
suggested that the mental state of the officer will be an important element of the
conduct that will shock the judicial conscience,57 and used examples such as
"shooting into a crowd at close range""8 or "engag[ing] in a reckless and dangerous
joy-ride for no good reason."" What the circuit courts have not discussed is how
they would reconcile the evil intent they seem to expect with the Court's conclusion
in Graham that malice should not be an element of a constitutional claim for
excessive force unless the plaintiff is a convicted criminal.'
D.

The Fourth Amendment as an Alternative
It has always been clear that the circuit courts invoked substantive due process
because they assumed Brower had made a Fourth Amendment claim unavailable,61
but the assumption that bystanders and other targets of a police response are
excluded from Fourth Amendment protection has never been fully tested. While the
Brower opinion gave close attention to whether the particular facts fit a precise
definition of when a suspect is literally "seized" by the police,' there are other
ways the Fourth Amendment could be a foundation for section 1983 claims. An
alternative model is provided by the body of doctrine that defines the constitutional
rights of prison and jail inmates against excessive force. Arrestees are protected
against excessive force during arrest by the Fourth Amendment and convicted
prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment, but neither Amendment provides
an explicit right for a person detained in jail between the arrest and conviction.6 3
The Supreme Court has filled that gap by recognizing that detainees in jail have a
Fourteenth Amendment right that is at least as protective as a convicted prisoner's
52. Fagan,22 F.3d at 1303.
53. Rucker, 946 F.2d at 282 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
54. Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987).
55. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 119.
56. Id.
57. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1307.
58. Rucker, 946 F.2d at 282.
59. Jones, 827 F.2d at 1107.
60. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1989).
61. See, e.g., Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1993); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th
Cir. 1993); Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1990).
62. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1989).
63. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
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Eighth Amendment right.' This application ensures that Eighth Amendment
doctrine will provide the anchor and structure of a textual right the Court has so
often emphasized.
There is one major obstacle to using the Fourth Amendment in a similar manner
to define the rights of bystanders. The circuit courts have interpreted Brower as
limiting the protection of the Fourth Amendment to such a narrow class of suspects
and such a restricted set of facts that there do not appear to be any Fourth
Amendment rights that could protect bystanders. That is the same interpretation the
Ninth Circuit noted in Lewis to explain why there was no Fourth Amendment claim
even though a target of a police pursuit was killed by the pursuing officer.'
However, the use of substantive due process to fill the space not covered by Brower
gave short shrift to Graham. It is by no means clear that this interpretation is either
proper or in error, because the Supreme Court has never addressed the proper
balance between Brower and Graham. It is also clear that striking a different
balance to give greater weight to Graham and less to Brower would allow the courts
to use the Fourth Amendment as the explicit textual foundation for bystander rights.
Whether the Court should coordinate Brower and Graham this way cannot be
answered by seeking quotations to prove that the result is either compelled or
forbidden. Rather the test should be whether using the Fourth Amendment as the
foundation for bystander rights will allow for more coherent doctrine.
Defining bystander rights under the Fourth Amendment, not literally but
following the model for detainees under the Eighth Amendment, would define the
constitutional claim against the police officer and police department in a manner
that would fit well with the rest of section 1983 doctrine. Defining bystander rights
under the Fourth Amendment when they are injured by a police effort to make a
seizure would not create a generalized substitute for actions under state tort law. It
would not conflict with DeShaney because it would not extend to all victims of third
party violence. A Fourth Amendment basis would not create a claim that is
inconsistent with Collins because it would not extend to victims of every city
department; it would leave tort law to govern other traditionally tortious conduct.
At the same time, a Fourth Amendment claim would eliminate the distinctions that
can appear so arbitrary when a single police response is judged under two distinct
constitutional rights. A Fourth Amendment foundation does not mean that injured
bystanders will always recover damages, nor does it mean that the police cannot
pursue suspects and attempt to arrest criminals. It only includes bystanders within
the protection of the constitutional text that police officers and their departments
must already consider when they use force to combat crime.

64. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983). See also Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127 (1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989).
65. See Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 438 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
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BYSTANDER PROTECTION UNDER SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

A.

The Path to a Substantive Due Process Claim
The real surprise is not that injured bystanders have so often failed when they
have asserted a substantive due process claim, but that any court has suggested
bystanders are protected by a constitutional right at all. The first mention of
bystander rights in a Supreme Court opinion was clearly adverse to any
constitutional right, as that opinion used an injury to a bystander to illustrate rights
that were outside the zone of constitutional protection. This inauspicious start came
in Paul v. Davis,6 a case that rejected a section 1983 claim by a plaintiff who had
been the target of a police flyer warning merchants of known shoplifters.6 7 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion declared that section 1983 should not permit a claim
for "every legally cognizable injury" by a state actor and held that the plaintiff's
only remedy was state defamation law.' His examples of other injuries that would
not create constitutional claims were "an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a
policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle. "I These
particular examples were dictum, but they gave bystanders the added burden of
trying to find a viable constitutional right in the face of a strong suggestion that they
had none.
The negative comments of Paul were reaffirmed thirteen years later in Brower
v. County of Inyo ' Once again the facts did not involve an injured bystander. The
plaintiff was the survivor of a fleeing driver who had been killed by a police
roadblock. Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that a fleeing driver had a Fourth
Amendment claim, but emphasized that violation of the Fourth Amendment
"requires an intentional acquisition of physical control" because otherwise there is
no unconstitutional seizure.7" His discussion illustrated when pursuit of a suspect
creates a seizure, excluding cases where the officer does not intend to control a
suspect and cases where the officer has not been able to stop the suspect. 2 His
analysis included only cases where the officer both intends to stop the suspect and
actually does stop the suspect in the intended way. To further emphasize that a
seizure had to be intended, Justice Scalia used an illustration: "Thus, if a parked
and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins a passerby against a wall, it is
likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. "73 By
emphasizing that suspects cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment until actually
seized, and that someone not the target of a police response only has a tort claim,
the Court's examples in Brower also appeared to place bystanders outside the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See id. at 695.
See id. at 699.
Id. at 698.
489 U.S. 593 (1989).
Id. at 595-96.

72. See id.

73. Id. at 596.
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Bystanders apparently assumed that they should work around Brower's definition
of a seizure, so they sought a constitutional right outside the Fourth Amendment.
Before Brower, they might have based their claim on the excessive force theory
found in Judge Friendly's opinion in Johnson v. Glick.74 While that was a suit by
a prisoner, the theory was more widely applied. However, the Court undercut that
possibility in the course of addressing the rights of suspects in Graham.7 5 As Chief
Justice Rehnquist recounted the history, between 1973 and 1989 many lower federal
courts assumed that Johnson supported "a generic 'right' to be free from excessive
force, grounded not in any particular provision but rather in 'basic principles of
section 1983 jurisprudence.'" 76 Graham explicitly rejected "this notion that all
excessive force claims brought under section 1983 are governed by a single generic
standard. "' Instead, in most instances an excessive force claim will be governed
by either the Eighth Amendment or the Fourth Amendment, as "the two primary
sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive government
conduct."' While Graham clarified which doctrine would govern the most typical
excessive force claims, it was silent about the applicable doctrine when the
excessive force is not governed by either the Eighth or Fourth Amendment.
Other Supreme Court decisions appeared to negate another source of
constitutional protection for bystanders before it could be considered. In DeShaney
the Court held that due process does not require the state to protect the public from
injuries caused by third parties.' Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion acknowledged
that specific constitutional provisions such as the Eighth Amendment impose a duty
to protect persons instate custody, but concluded that Social Services had no duty
to protect Joshua DeShaney from his own father because he was not in state
custody.'"In Collins, the Court applied DeShaney to a section 1983 claim arising
out of the death of a city employee, again holding that substantive due process does
not create a general duty to provide safety or security. 8 Justice Stevens' opinion
noted that due process imposed some duty to protect certain groups such as pretrial
detainees, persons in mental institutions, convicted felons, and persons under arrest,
but rejected
the argument that a city employee could be considered deprived of
82
liberty.
Because bystanders are neither in custody nor deprived of liberty before being
injured, DeShaney and Collins warned bystanders they would not be likely to
succeed if they argued that the police have a duty to protect all bystanders. As a
result, injured bystanders assumed they had to find a substantive due process theory
not yet rejected by the Court. In Collins, the Court assumed a substantive due
process claim might be viable when it considered whether the city's conduct toward

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

481 F.2d 1028, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989).
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Id. at 394.
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See id. at 127-28.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 28

83
its employees was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense."
The assumption did not have to be tested, because the Court held there was no
constitutional violation under any standard.' The opinion declared that the Court
was not shocked by an injury to a city employee who still had a "fairly typical state
tort law claim" so that any federal duties imposed under due process would be
analogous to those generally governed by state law.' This mention of the
conscience shocking branch of substantive due process confirms that the Court has
not yet completely rejected it, but the lack of any supporting precedent is a
reminder that it has never been found sufficient to support a claim.
The Court's later decision in Albright v. Oliver16 suggests that the more
significant part of Collins is not the mention of the conscience shocking standard,
but rather the unanimity behind the explanation that "the Court has always been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchart[ ]ed area are scarce and open-ended. "87
The plaintiff in Albright asserted that a police officer had subjected him to criminal
prosecution without probable cause.8 8 The narrow question was whether the plaintiff
could pursue a substantive due process claim on those facts. The Court's 7-2
answer, that he could not, took five opinions to support the result and one
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a four-judge plurality
stressed the Collins observation, and held that the plaintiff did not have a
substantive due process claim because the Fourth Amendment provides "an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection."'89 Concurring opinions by Justices
Scalia, Ginsburg and Souter agreed that substantive due process could not be used
to supplement or duplicate explicit provisions.' Other opinions in Albright
approached the issues differently, but did not question the caution in Collins against
substantive due process.91

The Conscience Shocking Standard
The conscience shocking standard for substantive due process was developed
most thoroughly in Fagan v. City of Vineland, a case heard twice by the Third
Circuit, first by a panel' and again on a rehearing en banc 3 This case began in
1988 with an early morning police pursuit of a traffic offender.9 The offense was
minor-allowing a passenger to stand up through a Camaro's open T-top roof while
the car was moving on a city street. The officer's intended response was minor-a
warning to the driver for "allowing his passenger to ride on parts not intended
B.
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Id. at 128.
See id. at 130.
Id. at 128.
510 U.S. 266 (1994).
Id. at 271-72.
See id.
Id. at 273.
See id.
at 275 (Scalia, J.); 276 (Ginsburg, J.); 286 (Souter, J.).
at 281 (Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.); 291 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ.).
See id.
Aug. 5, 1993), opinion vacated 5 F.3d 649 (3d. Cir. 1993).
See 1993 WL 290386 (3d Cir.,
See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1299-1300.
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for. "I However, the driver did not stop, so the officer pursued. The offenses
increased when the fleeing driver turned his lights off, drove at speeds up to 70-80
miles per hour on city streets, ran several red lights, and sped past officers who
tried to stop him. Three other police officers assisted the original officer by trying
to stop the suspect and by joining in parts of the pursuit; some officers pursued at
speeds up to 50-60 miles per hour. When the suspect ran a red light at a major
intersection in the city, his Camaro crashed broadside into a pickup truck. Both
occupants of the pickup and one passenger in the Camaro were killed. Two other
passengers in the Camaro were seriously injured. The fleeing driver was an
intoxicated 20 year old male with a blood alcohol level of .12%. The driver
suffered minor injuries; eventually he was convicted of three counts of
manslaughter. 96
The survivors and the relatives and estates of those who died filed five
consolidated actions in federal court against the city and the police officers. 97 The
civil rights claims under section 1983 asserted both a Fourth Amendment claim and
a substantive due process claim. In 1991 the trial judge granted a defense motion
for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, holding there was no
claim as a matter of law because none of the victims in either the Camaro or the
pickup had been "seized" by the pursuing officers.98 The trial judge denied the
defense motion for summary judgment on the substantive due process claim. 99 The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not assert a substantive due process
claim, asserting that plaintiffs had no constitutional claim other than their Fourth
Amendment claim. " However, the trial judge rejected this "all or nothing"
interpretation and concluded that a substantive due process claim could still be
asserted even if bystanders could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim for the use
of excessive force."0 ' While plaintiffs might have thought this denial of summary
judgment meant they could take their substantive due process claim to trial, that did
not happen.
In 1992 after the case was transferred to a different trial judge, the defendants
filed a second motion for summary judgment. The second judge concluded that the
original ruling had decided only a question of law about the possibility of a
substantive due process claim and not whether there was any evidence in support
of that claim. 12 After reviewing case law from outside the Third Circuit, the trial
judge concluded that "in cases involving police pursuits, most courts have applied
something akin to the shocks-the-conscience test."13 The judge reviewed the
depositions of both the police officers and plaintiff's expert to determine if the
evidence described a police behavior that was "outrageous" or "offends a sense of

95. Id. at 1299. The facts regarding Fagan may be found at id. at 1299-1300.
96. See State v. Pindale, 592 A.2d 300 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991), 652 A.2d 237 (N.J. Super. A.D.), cert.
denied, 663 A.2d 1357 (N.J. 1995).
97. See Fagan v. Town of Vineland, 804 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.J. 1992).
98. See id. at 596.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 600.
103. Id. at 601.
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justice.""° The trial judge suggested that the officers "may have shown poor
judgment," but interpreted the testimony of plaintiff's expert as proving no more
than "the officers thought through their actions, but came to the wrong conclusion
under the police pursuit guidelines.""°s At most, the judge concluded, the officers
might have made a wrong decision but no jury would be able to find their conduct
shocking or outrageous. " Therefore, the trial judge granted the defense motion for
summary judgment on the substantive due process claim.
On appeal the plaintiffs argued that the standard for a substantive due process
claim should be recklessness instead of the more stringent "shocks the conscience"
test.17 Plaintiffs did not appeal the rejection of their Fourth Amendment claim. 1o
It also appears that the only dispute was the proper standard for a substantive due
process claim, with the existence of that claim not even contested. With the issues
reduced to a single question of the proper standard, a three judge panel in 1993
reversed the grant of summary judgment. 11 The majority opinion by Judge Cowen
held that the plaintiff's claim should be considered under the reckless indifference
to public safety standard for a substantive due process claim.1 ' Chief Judge
Sloviter's dissenting opinion argued that a reckless indifference standard was
grounded in tort law instead of any specific constitutional right; she argued that the
proper standard for a substantive due process claim was "an abuse of official power
that 'shocks the conscience..". Within a month, the split among the members of
the 1993 panel
was mooted when the opinion was vacated by a vote for rehearing
2
1
banc.
en
In 1994 the same two judges wrote new opinions repeating their same positions,
but the votes and result were different. The full court split 8-4, with Chief Judge
Sloviter this time writing a majority opinion that held that a substantive due process
claim must be measured by the "shocks the conscience" standard."I Using that
standard, the majority affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims
against the police officers. 1 4 The majority suggested several reasons for its
conclusion that reckless indifference was not the standard for substantive due
process: 1) the Supreme Court mentioned only the "shocks the conscience"
standard in Collins;.. 2) the standard had been applied by numerous courts of
appeals to other kinds of police use of force; 6 3) a standard based exclusively on
intent would improperly convert common law torts into due process claims;" 7 and
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Id. at 603.
Id. at 603-05.
See id.
Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1301.

108. See id.

109. See id.at 1302.
110. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, No. 90-00310, 1993 WL 290386, at *14 (3d Cir., Aug. 5,1993), vacated
5 F.3d 647 (1993).
111. Id. at *21.
112. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 5 F.3d 647 (3d. Cir. 1993).
113. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1302.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1303.
116. See id. at 1305.
117. See id. at 1305-07.
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4) the Supreme Court gave repeated warnings against an "overly generous"
interpretation of substantive due process."'
With the reversal in outcome, Judge Cowen's majority opinion for the original
panel was recast as a lengthy dissenting opinion from the en banc decision. Once
again he concluded that reckless indifference to public safety should be a sufficient
standard for bystander claims." 9 He argued at length that the "shocks the
conscience" test was inappropriate and impractical."o He reiterated that reckless
indifference was considered a sufficiently arbitrary exercise of governmental power
to support other civil rights claims such as those asserted by prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment. 2 ' Lastly, he argued that other courts had used the reckless
indifference standard in various contexts.'" As in his panel opinion, he neither
mentioned a Fourth Amendment claim nor disagreed with Chief Judge Sloviter's
conclusion that a bystander could have a substantive due process claim.
As the Third Circuit noted, earlier decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
had reached the same conclusion on similar facts." In the Fourth Circuit case the
officer pursued a suspect who stole $17 worth of gas and sped from 65 to 105 miles
per hour on a narrow road until the suspect lost control on a curve and both the
suspect and officer crashed into another car. 4 The driver of the other car was
severely injured. The Fourth Circuit explicitly adopted the "shocks the conscience"
standard and affirmed the defense motion for summary judgment because the
officer's conduct, while "disturbing and lacking in judgment" did not shock the
judicial conscience.' In the Sixth Circuit case, a driver who had been involved in
a property damage accident was pursued for nine miles at 120 to 135 miles per
hour."2 The pursuit ended when the suspect crossed the center line and collided
with another car. 2 7 The Sixth Circuit analyzed the substantive due process claim
under a gross negligence standard," 2 but rejected the claim because the police
response was not "outrageous conduct or arbitrary use of government power."' 29
One good measure of the conscience shocking standard for substantive due
process is the record of its application. The Fourth Circuit discussed its standard
again in a case in which a bystander was shot and killed by one of three police
officers who fired over a dozen shots at a suspect's car. 30 The appellate court
affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the defendant with an opinion that
emphasized that a plaintiff would have to prove that the police conduct was
"arbitrary and irrational", "unjustified by any circumstance or governmental
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interest", "literally incapable of avoidance" ,131 and that it amounted to a "brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power". 132
Two other circuits have also suggested that a bystander could establish a
substantive due process violation under the conscience shocking standard but
likewise found the evidence insufficient. The First Circuit affirmed the entry of
judgment as a matter of law in favor of police officer defendants who had been
pursuing suspected drug sellers at high speeds through the crowded streets of
Boston before the drug sellers ran down a ten-year-old girl trying to cross the
street.133 The court asked if the conduct shocked the conscience and found that the
defendant's conduct did not even present a "close call" in comparison to other
pursuits that had not shocked the conscience in other circuits. 134 A year later the
First Circuit again affirmed the entry of summary judgment for defendants because
the "mixed signals" that a pursuit was improper were not enough to show that the
police conduct shocked the conscience.1 35 The Seventh Circuit did not explicitly
identify a standard in affirming the dismissal of a complaint that alleged that a
bystander was killed in a collision that was terminated after a three mile chase, at
120 miles per hour, by an officer who failed to use his siren or warning lights or
call his supervisor on the radio. 136 In concluding that the plaintiff could not prove
the chase was unconstitutional because the federal courts had never found an officer
liable for an improper pursuit, 137 the Seventh Circuit opinion implicitly adopted the
conscience shocking standard.
C. Recklessness as a Variationon the Standard
The Tenth Circuit provided an alternative definition of the standard for a
substantive due process claim in Medina v. Denver.138 It concluded that an
39
allegation of reckless intent would suffice to allege a claim against the officers. '1
Once again the police were involved in a high speed pursuit. The bystander was a
bicyclist who was injured when a suspect being chased by the Denver police lost
control of a stolen car. "4 In deciding whether the defendants were entitled to
summary judgment, both the trial judge and appellate court accepted plaintiff's
allegations regarding the police response as true."'4 The police conduct described
by the court included: a pursuit on a busy residential street during rush hour at
speeds of over 60 miles per hour while repeatedly running lights and stop signs;
improper radio communication with the dispatcher; deliberate disregard of a
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supervisory order to stop the pursuit; and two police cars coming from opposite
42
directions forced the suspect to turn into a bicyclist.
The trial court entered summary judgment for all defendants on the ground that
the police conduct was not directed toward the bicyclist. On appeal, the plaintiff
abandoned any reliance on the Fourth Amendment, trying to steer clear of Brower's
apparent negation of any Fourth Amendment claim by a bystander.' 4 3 The Tenth
Circuit assumed that the bystander's injuries established a due process violation by
a government official, and focused on whether the police conduct had to be directed
at the injured bystander. The Denver police officers championed the trial court's
reasoning that the conduct had to be directed at the particular victim, while the
bystander argued that such particularized harm was not required.'" The Tenth
Circuit rejected the argument that a police response would violate the Constitution
only when directed at the particular plaintiff. Instead, they held that "reckless intent
may violate section 1983" if the conduct creates a substantial risk to a limited and
definable group that included the plaintiff. 45 The court also set the standard for
recklessness very high, requiring "wanton or obdurate disregard or complete
indifference" to a "substantial risk" of death or injury. 'I
The Tenth Circuit did not decide if a bystander such as a bicyclist could be
included in the limited and definable group placed at risk by a high speed pursuit,
nor did it decide if plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to prove reckless intent. It
declared that the allegations were adequate to survive a summary judgment motion,
but gave the issue no more attention because it affirmed the summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds because the constitutional right had not been clearly
established at the time of the chase. 47
A later Tenth Circuit decision suggested that bystanders would be no more likely
to succeed under the recklessness standard than under the conscience shocking
standard. In Webber v. Mefford 48 the bystanders were in a vehicle struck by a
fleeing suspect who veered into oncoming traffic. 149 The plaintiffs did not argue that
the pursuit itself was reckless, arguing instead that the officer was recklessly
indifferent in the way he confronted the sleeping suspect and allowed him to flee
at high speed.' 50 On appeal from the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the appellate court thrice emphasized the difficulty of proving
reckless indifference-"wanton or obdurate disregard",' "true indifference to
risks", 52and "conscious acceptance of a known, serious risk." 3 At most the court
suggested the officer was negligent. The plaintiff's argument that the officer could
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
1990)).
153.

See id. at 1497.
See id.at 1495 n.3.
See id. at 1496.
Id. at 1496.
Id.
See id.
43 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1342.
See id.
Id. at 1343 (quoting Medina v. Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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have taken precautions was summarily dismissed as "criticisms made in hindsight
that are not grounded in the realities of law enforcement."""4
In a recent decision on a related issue the Tenth Circuit moved into agreement
with the other circuits by holding that a substantive due process violation requires
both reckless intent by the officer and conduct that shocks the conscience. In
Williams v. Denver55 the bystander was a driver who was broadsided by a police
officer speeding at 60 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone on a major
boulevard at 4:00 a.m. with warning lights but no siren. " There was no emergency
and the officer was not pursuing a suspect. 1 7 He was responding to a
nonemergency request from another officer for backup assistance to arrest a car
thief. 58 The panel agreed unanimously that a substantive due process claim requires
conduct that shocks the conscience."5 9 The majority also concluded that the evidence
supported the inference that the officer was "speeding for speeding's sake" 6" and
that such conduct could be both reckless and shocking to the conscience because it
was unjustified.' 6' That finding did not permit the plaintiff to overcome the officer's
motion for summary judgment."6 The majority affirmed the summary judgment for
the officers on qualified immunity grounds.' 63
The third member of the panel in Williams disagreed only with the suggestion
that the officer's conduct could have been found to shock the conscience, arguing
that the officer's driving was no worse than reckless and that the precedent did not
allow recovery for reckless driving under section 1983.11 The dissenting opinion's
summary of the cases accurately reflects the typical response of federal judges to
bystander claims.
[M]y survey of the case law reveals that courts very rarely find that the
operation of a police vehicle in the performance of official duties shocks the
conscience in the constitutional sense. The majority does not even attempt to
cite cases where the court has found such conduct to be conscience-shocking.
I have provided a partial list of cases where courts have specifically found such
conduct is not conscience-shocking. The reason for this is obvious: courts
demand a very high level of culpability before they will conclude that police
performing their duties, albeit negligently, carelessly, or recklessly, have
violated the substantive due process clause of the constitution."
The position of the Tenth Circuit took another twist in 1997 when the court
vacated its decision in Williams and granted rehearing en banc. 16 A later
154. Webber, 43 F.3d at 1344.
155. 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, March 3, 1997, as noted in Rowe v.
City of Marlow, Nos. 96-6144, 96-6229, 1997 WL 353001, at *5 n.7 (10th Cir. June 26, 1997).
156. See id. at 1012.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1021.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1023 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1025 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
166. See No. 94-1190, vacated and reh'g en banc granted, March 3, 1997 (10th Cir.) (unpublished).
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unpublished opinion noted that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari "to
address the legal standard of conduct necessary to establish a substantive due
process violation in a police pursuit case" and described the Tenth Circuit as
following the "deliberate or reckless intent" standard of its earlier cases. 67
Substantive Due Process as a Symbolic Right
Constitutional claims by bystanders against police officers are still new and fairly
infrequent, so the substantive due process right suggested in the circuit court
decisions should be evaluated as a work in progress and not the final answer. In that
light, it is important that the results to date not obscure the consistent message that
bystanders deserve constitutional protection. While the positive message for
bystanders was further muted by the examples used to illustrate how rarely any
bystander might prove a constitutional violation, the circuit courts were constrained
in their choice of examples by what they saw as the limits of substantive due
process. The substantive due process claim could not appear to be readily available
to every injured bystander, because a generalized excessive force claim had been
rejected in Graham. In addition, each example of a constitutional claim had to be
distinguished from the "fairly typical state-law tort claim" that creates no liability
under section 1983.16
The difficulty of the task explains why the examples suggested there would be
a constitutional violation in cases in which an officer intentionally engages in
improper conduct by using the "police vehicle to terrorize a civilian . . . with
malicious abuse of official power"" 6 or "directs his actions toward the
bystander."'" Those are contrasted with the suggestion there would be no violation
if the officer's intent was to "protect public safety."' In Williams the court
explicitly raised the Tenth Circuit's standard from recklessness to conscience
shocking. It also insisted that the officer's state of mind was important because
"conduct which poses an imminent risk of serious harm and which is motivated by
an improper purpose is unquestionably more likely to shock the conscience than the
same actions done for legitimate reasons." However, by insisting that the
officer's malice or intentional abuse is an element of a viable claim and excluding
any claim if the officer acts in good faith, the examples were out of synch with the
Court's section 1983 doctrine before the ink was dry.
The circuit court opinions failed to examine whether the subjective element of
the officer's bad intent was consistent with the Court's previous position that there
73
is no state of mind requirement independent of the underlying constitutional right.
In Collins, the Court explicitly held that section 1983 "does not draw any
distinction between abusive and non-abusive federal violations." 4 Including a
D.
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subjective element leaves bystanders with less constitutional protection than suspects
who do not have to prove bad intent for a Fourth Amendment claim. 75 Requiring
that the officer's intent be an element of the claim leaves bystanders with the same
protection as convicted criminals. In cases involving the use of force in a prison to
enforce discipline, an Eighth Amendment claim brought by the prisoner requires
proof that the guards acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm."76 In Graham the Court held that this higher standard was proper
for a section 1983 plaintiff who had been convicted of a crime, but that it was out
of place for a suspect who had not been convicted. 7 It seems incongruous to
require bystanders to meet the same malice standard as convicted prisoners, when
bystanders are neither convicted nor suspected. In fact, requiring bystanders to
prove the kind of malice described by the circuit courts in their examples would
make their proof of a prima facie case so onerous that the defense of qualified
immunity would be almost superfluous.
One other consequence of requiring that the officer's bad intent be an element
of the substantive due process claim is that it shrinks the class protected by this
right to a handful or even none. Even if the officer has the kind of bad intent
described in the circuit court examples, the victim will have no claim unless the
officer takes some action that causes harm. The most likely action would be an
arrest, a search, or a seizure, but a victim of those actions will have an explicit
Fourth Amendment claim and will no longer be a bystander. For example, a recent
Fifth Circuit decision held that the Fourth Amendment governed a claim that a
deputy sheriff "violently and without cause" jerked a suspect's ten year old
daughter out of her chair and dragged her out of the room.' A Sixth Circuit
decision held there was a Fourth Amendment claim where a bystander was detained
by the police for four hours without cause while they prepared to arrest a suspect. "9
A Pennsylvania district court recognized a Fourth Amendment claim when an
officer intentionally shot a burglary victim after mistaking the victim for the
suspect. 0
Thus, the only class of bystanders that appears eligible for protection under the
conscience shocking standard of substantive due process would be those bystanders
harmed without being arrested, seized, stopped, or searched by an officer who
acted in bad faith without intending to protect public safety. The absence of actual
cases with those facts provides evidence that the circuit courts described a
substantive due process right that is vanishingly narrow.
E. Substantive Due Process in the Ninth Circuit
The facts of Lewis are an important ingredient in comparing the Ninth Circuit
analysis with the consensus interpretation of the other circuits. The incident that
gave rise to the pursuit in this case began shortly after two police officers in
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Sacramento County, James Smith and Murray Stapp, responded to a call one
evening about a fight.'' As the two officers returned to their patrol cars, Smith saw
Stapp turn on his overhead lights and yell something at two boys riding a
motorcycle.' 82 The motorcycle driver did not stop; instead, he drove slowly
between the two police cars and accelerated."S As Smith watched this scenario, he
knew the boys were not involved in the fight, he did not hear what Stapp said to
them, and he did not know why Stapp yelled at the boys. Instead of asking, Smith
pursued the motorcycle through a residential area for over a mile at speeds up to
100 miles per hour through four stop lights. Then the motorcycle went over a crest
in the road and skidded to a halt when the driver tried a hard left turn. Deputy
Smith came over the crest at a speed of at least 65 miles per hour and saw the
motorcycle and passenger too late to stop. The patrol car skidded 147 feet before
hitting the passenger at 40 miles per hour. The passenger was thrown 70 feet down
the road and died at the scene.
The personal representatives of the passenger's estate sued both the pursuing
deputy and his department under section 1983 and California law, but the only
claim remaining for the Supreme Court's review is the substantive due process
claim against the deputy. The officer moved for summary judgment on the ground
of qualified immunity, arguing that the substantive due process limits on a police
pursuit had not been clearly established at the time of incident. In order to
overcome the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff had to show both that the
right did exist and that it had already become clearly established at the time of the
pursuit."' 4 The trial judge did not decide if the right existed at all, but decided that
in any event it had not been clearly established at the time of the pursuit, and on
s On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
that basis granted summary judgment for the deputy. "
decided both that the substantive due process right did protect someone injured in
a police pursuit and that the right had been clearly established six years earlier at
the time of the pursuit. 86
The holding in Lewis is not based on any specific Supreme Court precedent.
Instead, the opinion started with the proposition that "constitutional due process
rights may be implicated" when "a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to
deprive a person of life."' It then blended a number of Supreme Court cases,
Ninth Circuit precedent on various kinds of section 1983 claims against police
officers, and the decisions in pursuit cases from other circuits to support the
conclusion that there was clearly a substantive due process claim. The opinion then
proceeded to its prime topic of identifying the standard of conduct for measuring
liability under substantive due process. It again blended a number of cases in
support of the conclusion that the standard for a substantive due process claim in
a pursuit case is "deliberate indifference or reckless disregard" to life.' 8 8 Finally,
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the opinion held that the plaintiff had enough evidence to create a triable issue of
fact under that standard and reversed the grant of summary judgment.
While the Lewis standard is explicitly more favorable for plaintiffs than the
conscience shocking standard, the difference in labels does not necessarily mean the
results will always vary in application. The various circuit courts might still reach
similar conclusions on the same facts. For example, the First Circuit found no
substantive due process violation under the conscience shocking standard in two
cases-one where the officers were pursuing an apparent drug dealer' 89 and another
where they suspected a driver leaving the scene of a disturbance was intoxicated.'"
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that there could be a substantive due process
violation under the reckless disregard standard when the officer knew of no crime
committed by the boys on a motorcycle and pursued them only because they fled. 9'
Perhaps the First Circuit would find that the facts in Lewis did shock the court's
conscience, while the Ninth Circuit would find that pursuing a drug seller or drunk
driver did not show reckless disregard of the lives of bystanders.
Bystander plaintiffs may be encouraged by the Lewis analysis even though the
victim was more involved in the criminal activity than the typical bystander who is
another driver or a pedestrian. The opinion did not limit the protection of its
substantive due process right to suspects or other targets being chased by the police.
It also included the "enormity of the danger" to the driver, passenger, and the
general public among the reasons that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to defeat
the motion for summary judgment. "9In two unpublished opinions, a different Ninth
Circuit panel applied Lewis to claims by bystanders injured in police pursuits. "
The First Circuit considered Lewis as relevant precedent on bystander claims before
rejecting its holding."
The First Circuit's commentary on Lewis identified the two most difficult issues
framed by the competing standards for substantive due process when it suggested
that the Ninth Circuit both misread the Supreme Court's decisions and was not
sufficiently concerned about the problems of law enforcement. '5 Those issues are
most difficult because the Supreme Court has not yet provided an answer and its
opinions can be employed to support different conclusions. For example, while the
circuit courts that adopted the conscience shocking standard were correct that the
Court has been reluctant to expand the substantive due process right, opinions from
other circuits were equally correct that the Court had not flatly negated evolution
of the substantive due process right." While the other circuit courts assumed that
the Court's reminders about the pressure on officers to make "split-second

189. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1041 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1693 (1997).
190. See Bovieri v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 6 (1stCir. 1997).
191. See Lewis, 98 F.3d at 443.
192. See id.
193. See Onossian v. Block, No. 95-55837, 103 F.3d 140 (table), 1996 WL 717312 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996)
(unpublished); Torres v. BoniUa, No. 95-55875, 103 F.3d 141 (table), 1996 WL 717313 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996)
(unpublished).
194. See Evans, 100 F.3d at 1037-38.
195. See id. at 1038 n.4.
196. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1995).
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judgments" 97 meant they should rarely find that conduct shocks their conscience,
the Ninth Circuit was equally correct that the Court has held that officers can be
liable for arbitrary conduct based on swift decisions. 198 The debate could go on in
circles if it is limited to substantive due process precedents. The next section
examines how the Court's Fourth Amendment precedent provides a different
perspective and a different way to impose a structure on the question.
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

A.

Evolution of the Excessive Force Claim
The three Supreme Court decisions that established that suspects are protected
by the Fourth Amendment were actually the second stage in the evolution of a
suspect's constitutional right to be free from police use of excessive force during
an arrest. Each stage was the result of a different assumption about the character
of a civil rights claim. In the first stage, the federal courts assumed that section
1983 had created a variety of tort liability; hence the actions were labeled as
constitutional tort claims."9 During this stage the lower federal courts often decided
excessive force claims without identifying a specific constitutional provision;
instead they assumed that liability for wrongful conduct could be based on the
substantive due process doctrine.2" As a result, the constitutional standard was
identical whether the force was used by an arresting police officer or by a prison
guard. The Supreme Court neither affirmed nor rejected the lower court
development of this first stage; the Court itself sometimes assumed that victims of
excessive force could sue the police under section 1983 without specifying which
constitutional provision supported the claim. 2" The second stage began when the
Supreme Court gave increased emphasis to identifying an explicit textual basis for
any constitutional claim.
1. The Constitutional Tort Claim Stage
In the first stage, when all excessive force claims were considered to be more a
variety of tort claims than an action to enforce an explicit constitutional provision,
the elements of an excessive force claim were based on a four factor test developed
by Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit. In Johnson v. Glick,' he considered a
claim by a pretrial detainee that a guard had used excessive force. Judge Friendly
concluded that the Eighth Amendment did not apply, because a detainee can not be
subject to punishment.' He also noted that the conduct did not fit the specific
command of the Fourth Amendment.2 Instead, he found constitutional protection

197. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
198. See, e.g., Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
199. See Marshal S. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 N.W. U. L REV.
277, 323-24 (1965).
200. See id. at 297-319.
201. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183, 189-90 n.1 (1977) (White, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
202. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).

203. See id. at 1030-32.
204. See id. at 1032.
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against physically abusive governmental conduct under substantive due process,
labeling the abuse a deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
order to establish a structure for identifying an unconstitutional use of force,
Johnson provided four factors:
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'
As Justice Rehnquist described the history of this first stage, following Johnson
v. Glick, "the vast majority of lower federal courts . . . applied its four-part
'substantive due process' test indiscriminately to all excessive force claims...
[because they] assume[d] . . . there is a generic 'right' to be free from excessive
force, grounded. . . in 'basic principles of § 1983 jurisprudence.'"' However,
even as the substantive due process claim of excessive force was taking shape in the
lower courts after 1973, the Court as early as 1976 was laying the foundation for
its demise with several cases that emphasized that section 1983 cannot alone be the
source of substantive rights.7
2. The Specific Constitutional Right Stage
In 1985 the second stage began in Garner.3 The Supreme Court held that using
deadly force to seize a suspect could violate the Fourth Amendment. This section
1983 case began after a police officer shot and killed a fleeing burglary suspect to
prevent him from climbing a fence and escaping into the night.' The complaint
asserted several constitutional claims, including a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
but the Court discussed only the Fourth Amendment claim.21 Garnermade clear
that a Fourth Amendment claim could be based on the manner in which the seizure
was made and that it was not limited to whether the police had probable cause for
the seizure. The Court further held that it would be constitutionally unreasonable
to use deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects without regard to the
particular circumstances.2
Instead, reasonableness required balancing the
governmental interests in effective law enforcement against competing reasons to
avoid deadly force, such as preserving the suspect's life and permitting judicial
determination of guilt and punishment."' As a result, the Court held that it would
be constitutional to use deadly force to prevent an escape if a suspect presented a
threat of serious physical harm, but not if there was no immediate threat to the
officer or others.213
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While Garnerprovided a foundation for a Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim, that step alone did not reduce the scope of the generic claim of excessive
force as a constitutional tort. That was true as well when Brower extended the
Fourth Amendment claim to different facts but did not mention substantive due
process. 2 14 Brower was brought after a fleeing driver was killed in a crash at a
police roadblock. The Ninth Circuit held that there was no Fourth Amendment
claim because the driver was never seized.215 Justice Scalia's majority opinion
rejected that reasoning as inconsistent with Garner, because in both cases the
suspect's flight was halted by the police use of force.21 6 Much of his opinion then
described outer boundaries on the Fourth Amendment claim with an extended
discussion of why there would be no "seizure" in a variety of other factual
circumstances. Brower included a brief reminder that a viable Fourth Amendment
claim would also require proof that the seizure was unreasonable and a proximate
cause of the injury. 1 7 The Court then remanded the case to allow the trial court to
consider whether the facts established an "unreasonable" seizure. 21' Four Justices
filed a concurring opinion because they
did not want to endorse the suggested
29
outcome on facts not before the Court.
During that same term the Court's decision in Graham v. Connor' confirmed
that the generic excessive force claim of the first stage had been replaced by the
new doctrine of the second stage. By the time Graham was decided the second stage
was already well under way in prisoner excessive force cases. In Whitley v.
Albers2 ' three years earlier the Court held that substantive due process did not
provide any additional protection for convicted prisoners beyond the Eighth
Amendment claim. In Graham the Court held that substantive due process doctrine
likewise should not govern a claim of excessive force against a police officer,
because the Fourth Amendment provided an explicit textual constitutional standard.
The opinion in Graham made explicit the second stage of the Court's structure
of constitutional doctrine. First, it explained that there was no "single generic
standard" for all excessive force claims, because the first step required a court "to
isolate the precise constitutional violation. " ' As a result, claims by prisoners
would be governed by Eighth Amendment doctrine, while Fourth Amendment
doctrine would govern claims of unreasonable seizures.' Second, it explained that
a substantive due process claim was inapplicable where the government conduct
was governed by a specific constitutional standard. 4
Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or
investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one
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invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment ....
Today, we make
explicit what was implicit in Garner'sanalysis, and hold that all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness"
standard, rather than under a "substantive due process" approach. Because the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive due process,"
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'
This explicit division between an Eighth Amendment claim and a Fourth
Amendment claim meant a new trial for Graham, because the lower court
requirement of proof that the officers acted with malice had brought an element of
an Eighth Amendment claim into a Fourth Amendment case.226 The Court reiterated
that an inquiry into an officer's subjective state of mind was proper in an Eighth
Amendment case, but rejected such an inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, the "Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of 'objective reasonableness' under
the circumstances." 7 Therefore, the Court remanded the case to allow the lower
courts to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the use of
force during the stop might have been objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances confronting the officers.' The Court emphasized that the plaintiff
would have a difficult task because reasonableness "must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight."' The test of reasonableness must also "embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."' At the same time,
that emphasis confirmed that a suspect could establish a constitutional violation if
the evidence established an objectively unreasonable use of force.
3. Extrapolating Beyond the Known Rules
The factual settings in Garner, Brower, and Graham had certain elements in
common. In each case the force used by the police was contemporaneous with their
apprehension of the target of the force. The deadly force killed Garner and Brower
and the nondeadly force was used when Graham was tackled and placed in the
police car. In each case the person who died or was injured was the target of the
force used by the police, and in each case the officers intended to use the particular
force that harmed the suspect. Those common elements also mean that the three
cases do not provide a complete answer when a case presents different facts. Of
particular interest here is a case where a person is injured by "excessive force ...
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in the context of an arrest""' but the force is not contemporaneous, or the injured
person is not the target of the force. Graham mandated analysis under the Fourth
Amendment but Brower seems to say that that cannot be; judging the claim under
substantive due process does not conflict with Brower but does seem to ignore
Graham.
The circuit court opinions have followed a consistent path in holding that a
plaintiff can assert a substantive due process claim when the facts present a different
pattern from the Court's three cases. This approach reconciles Brower and Graham
by giving greater weight to Brower and its definition of a seizure, but it does so at
the expense of Graham. Determining whether this is the correct way to extrapolate
the doctrinal structure requires a closer look at the foundation provided by Garner,
Brower and Graham.
B.

The Themes of Grahamand Brower

1. Graham
The primary focus of Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Graham is
the affirmation that there can be no single generic standard for all excessive force
claims, because a section 1983 claim must be based on a specific constitutional
right. He suggested that "in most instances" excessive force claims will involve
either the Fourth Amendment's limits on the force used when making arrests or the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners.32 On the
particular facts of Graham, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was
applicable because plaintiff's claim arose "in the context of an arrest or
investigatory stop" n or, alternatively phrased, "in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other 'seizure'."'
The Graham opinion did not describe whether there was any difference between
the "context" or "course" of an arrest and offered no definition of the outer
boundaries of either word. One clue that the Court did not intend to adopt a literal
interpretation of those words can be found in a footnote that defined "seizure". The
Chief Justice noted that the Court's cases had not established how long the Fourth
Amendment protection continued after the arrest ended and pretrial detention
began."5 He conceded that the Court would not answer that question in Graham,
but at the same time declared that the arrested prisoner's constitutional protection
did not abruptly end when either the course or context of the arrest came to an
end.3 6 He explained that a pretrial detainee is still protected from excessive force
while held in jail. 7 Even though the end of the arrest situation also ends the Fourth
Amendment protection, the Due Process Clause constrains a jailer's use of
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excessive force as well. 8 Finally, he noted that due process would not be the
source of protection from excessive force for a convicted prisoner, because that use
of due process would be redundant of the protection provided by the Eighth
Amendment. 2 9
The footnote discussion of the excessive force claim by a pretrial detainee
illustrates one notable example in which the Court has made use of the express text
to organize a coherent body of doctrine that extends beyond the literal language of
the constitutional text. As many courts have noted, it would be anomalous if a
pretrial detainee had no constitutional rights or fewer rights than someone already
convicted of a crime. The convicted inmate is incarcerated as a form of
punishment, while the detainee is incarcerated to insure attendance at trial. It would
also be impractical to define their right against excessive force differently, at least
in cases where disciplinary force is used against a jail population that includes both
detainees and convicted prisoners. The consensus on the best organizational
structure for excessive force claims by pretrial detainees eliminates any gap
between the end of the Fourth Amendment arrest situation and the Eighth
Amendment situation by using an analogy. Pretrial detainees are protected from
excessive force by a due process right that is equivalent to the Eighth Amendment
right that protects convicted prisoners. That standard provides jailers, detainees,
and judges with a coherent body of doctrine, and ensures that jailers are governed
by a single body of constitutional rules as they enforce discipline.
Decisions since Graham have emphasized both that substantive due process is not
a substitute for an explicit textual source of constitutional protection, and that an
injured plaintiff can recover if an explicit provision governs the "particular sort of
government behavior"' that causes the injury. In Collins the Court rejected the
effort to use substantive due process as the foundation for a right to safe working
conditions for municipal employees. 241 At the same time, it noted that city
employees were protected by the First Amendment if a dangerous assignment was
retaliation for political speech, and protected by the Equal Protection Clause if the
assignment was based on gender.242 In Albright v. Oliver243 the Court refused to
make substantive due process the foundation for a suspect's right to be free from
a groundless criminal prosecution. Various majority opinions did not agree on
whether the plaintiff might have a Fourth Amendment claim or a Fifth Amendment
claim but they did not doubt that plaintiff could assert such a claim if one fit the
facts of the particular case. Similarly, the opinion in Sandin v. Connor2' that
narrowed the procedural due process protection of inmates with a new standard for
a liberty interest included a footnote reminder that explicit rights such as the First
and Eighth Amendments and Equal Protection would still support a claim.24
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The structure of constitutional rights outlined by these decisions is interstitial,
leaving state tort law as the only remedy for most harm caused by a state actor and
a civil rights action as the remedy only when the specific conduct is governed by
an explicit constitutional provision. Collins is one example, with its reminder that
city employees could assert a First Amendment right if they were punished because
of their speech but that otherwise the same harm would not alone support a
substantive due process claim.' Sandin is another example, with the same
reminder that an inmate could have a First Amendment claim even if the harm
would not alone be a liberty deprivation. 7 For bystander claims, the motivation for
the police conduct could provide a similar boundary, since police actions to
apprehend a criminal are subject to the Fourth Amendment but equally harmful
conduct for a different purpose is not. The only opinion from a circuit court to
suggest such an approach did not start a trend. 8 Instead, Brower-or a certain
interpretation of Brower-has deflected bystanders away from using the explicit
source of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Brower
Brower held that a roadblock could be a Fourth Amendment violation, even
though the suspect crashed during his flight. 9 On this the Court was unanimous.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion also declared that an injured person would not
have a Fourth Amendment claim if injured by "the accidental effects of otherwise
lawful government conduct."' Brower's theme that a Fourth Amendment claim
requires a seizure was emphasized by examples presented to show why its holding
would not provide a Fourth Amendment claim to every suspect injured during a
pursuit nor to everyone injured by a police officer. First, there would be no
constitutional claim if a police car "slips its brake and pins a passerby."' Second,
there would be no constitutional claim even if that passerby was a fleeing felon
"running away from two pursuing constables."2 Third, there would be no
constitutional claim if a fleeing driver "unexpectedly loses control of his car and
crashes. "" Each example was presented to illustrate that the Fourth Amendment
requires "intentional acquisition of physical control"'
"through means
intentionally applied. "" The four Justices who declined to join Justice Scalia's
proposition that a Fourth Amendment violation "requires an intentional acquisition
of physical control" 6 did not specifically discuss any of his examples." 7
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Justice Scalia provided further commentary on Brower two years later in
California v. HodariD. 8 The facts were different since Hodari D. was a criminal
case and the Fourth Amendment issue was raised on a motion to suppress evidence
as the fruit of an unconstitutional search, but Justice Scalia's majority opinion made
use of Brower. Hodari's troubles started when he spotted an officer looking for
suspicious activity; he fled before the officer was close enough to grab him or what
he was holding?5 9 Hodari threw down an object as he was running away?' The
police retrieved it and found it was cocaine.26' Although the State conceded on
appeal that the officer had no grounds to stop Hodari,' the Court held that was not
important because the officer did not seize the contraband. Instead, the Court held
2
that the contraband had been abandoned before Hodari was apprehended. " Justice
Scalia's opinion declared that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur during
a chase, since fleeing suspects are not submitting to the police attempt to stop
them. 2' Holding that not even a suspect like Hodari can assert that the police
violated the Fourth Amendment during a pursuit seems to leave little hope that a
bystander could do so.
However, other themes in these opinions may not always pull together as the
facts change. While Hodari could not show a Fourth Amendment violation, the
Fourth Amendment still governs what an officer may do during a pursuit. The
comment in Hodari that Brower "did not even consider the possibility that a seizure
could have occurred during the course of the chase"2 stops short of declaring that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply, and does so for good reason. The Court in
Brower would have reached the opposite result if the Fourth Amendment does not
apply during the course of a pursuit. The roadblock in Brower was set up during
the pursuit, at a time when the suspect's flight showed he had not yet been seized.'
Even Garnerwould have been decided differently if the Fourth Amendment does
not apply during a pursuit. As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Hodari,
Garnerheld that unreasonable use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect violates
the Fourth Amendment.26 If the officer's shot violated a constitutional right in
Garner, the Fourth Amendment had to apply when the officer fired the shot and
2
before the officer could know whether the bullet would be effective. ' The lesson
Justice Stevens drew from Garner was neither rejected nor countered in Justice
Scalia's opinion, but the holding of Brower on its facts confirms that the
unconstitutional police action can precede the seizure.
An example discussed in both Brower and Hodari further illustrates that the
Fourth Amendment does apply during the pursuit. This common example focused
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on the Court's much earlier decision in Hester v. United States.' In Hester, the
Court held that there was no seizure when a revenue agent took possession of
moonshine containers dropped by a suspect during a pursuit. 27 However, in Brower
Justice Scalia declared that two facts would have meant a different result in Hester
because there would have been a seizure; first, if the agent had shouted "Stop and
give us those bottles, in the name of the law!" and second, if "the defendant and
his accomplice had complied."27 Again, of course, the officer can control only the
decision to demand the contraband, not the suspect's decision to ignore it or
comply. If the suspect's compliance means there is a Fourth Amendment violation
if it turns out the officer had no probable cause to demand its surrender, the action
that violated the Fourth Amendment took place during the pursuit.
The declaration in Brower that the police must intend to assert control to meet
the definition of seizure is illustrated by a limited range of examples. Justice Scalia
emphasized that a plaintiff did not have to prove that the officer intentionally caused
the injury in order to have a Fourth Amendment claim. He declared that there could
be a seizure even if the officers did not want the driver to crash, because "we do
not think it practicable to conduct such an inquiry into subjective intent. "'2 In other
examples, he declared that it would "draw too fine a line" to say "that one is not
seized who has been stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he
was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only
for the leg. "2' While this made clear that subjective intent is not required, it still
did not clarify what would suffice to show what the concurring Justices labeled as
the "concept of objective intent."' For that, it is useful to look at some parameters
in the Brower examples.
Two parameters that sort out the Brower examples are whether the Fourth
Amendment governed the intentional action and whether that action was the cause
of the injury. The first and second examples-no Fourth Amendment claim when
a runaway police car "slips its brake and pins a passerby against a wall," 5 even
if the passerby is a suspect being pursued by two constables-depend on an unstated
assumption that the officer who parked the car did not expect the brakes to fail. The
conduct of parking a police car is intentional but not governed by the Fourth
Amendment. Pursuing a suspect to make an arrest is intentional conduct governed
by the Fourth Amendment, but the example assumes that the pursuer did not release
the brake. The third example where there was no seizure-"flashing lights and
continuing pursuit"'276 -included a stated assumption that "the suspect unexpectedly
loses control of his car. "' While the pursuit would be governed by the Fourth
Amendment, the example assumed the pursuit was not the cause of the crash. This
third example was compared with the situation of a fleeing car sideswiped by a
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police cruiser, where intentional conduct described as "producing the crash" would
be both governed by the Fourth Amendment and the cause of the injury. 8
None of the Brower examples involved (i) intentional action governed by the
Fourth Amendment, such as an attempt to make a seizure, that (ii) caused an event
that was not subjectively intended but was objectively foreseeable, such as a
collision, that (iii) harmed a person who was not the intended target of the action,
such as a bystander. The example of an injured bystander highlights that there are
two parts to the statement in Brower that the Fourth Amendment does not address
the "accidental effects"' of "otherwise lawful" 280 police actions, and that Brower
did not fully mark either the boundary between accidental and intended effects or
the boundary between lawful and constitutionally unreasonable government
conduct.
C. Recalibrating Grahamand Brower
The holdings of Brower and Grahamare not in conflict. The conflict arises when
the holdings are applied to new facts. The circuit court decisions reconciled the
Court's opinions by giving primary weight to Brower's definition of a seizure and
lesser weight to Graham's preference for analysis under explicit constitutional
language. The alternative would strike the balance exactly opposite by giving
greater weight to Grahamand lesser weight to Brower. This alternative would make
the critical time the beginning of the police response rather than the end. Thus, "all
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force" would be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment alone in any case in which the officers intended to
make "an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen."2' This
alternative would also be consistent with the Court's application of the Fourth
Amendment to a civil seizure that involved the "same sort of governmental
conduct" as a criminal search,' and its refusal to apply the Fourth Amendment to
a civil seizure that was "beyond the traditional meaning" of a search and seizure.3
The holding in part III of Collins that substantive due process is not a substitute
for an explicit constitutional provision is an important message but not the only one
in that case. Equally important was the Court's rejection in part I of Collins of the
Fifth Circuit's holding that an "abuse of governmental power" was a necessary
element under section 1983 ,2" and the Court's conclusion that an abuse of power
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a claim under the statute.8 5
Collins involved a claim that the death of a city employee at an unsafe job site was
caused by inadequate training and equipment. 286 The Court held that the fact that
a government employee caused the harm would not suffice to establish liability
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under section 1983 unless there was also a violation of a constitutional right.3 The
opinion suggested that an employee would have a First Amendment claim if the
employee was sent on a particularly dangerous assignment in retaliation for
protected speech, 28 s and that an employee would also have an Equal Protection
claim if given that assignment based on gender." 9 The opinion also suggested a
citzen would have the same claim if a city employee injured them for one of those
reasons.290
In part I1 of Collins the Court stated it was not persuaded that the city's failure
to train or warn its employees was conscience shocking under a substantive due
process theory, and described plaintiffs claim as a typical tort claim under state
law. 29' The combination of parts I and HI of Collins reaffirmed that an important
distinction between conduct actionable under section 1983 and conduct actionable
only under tort law is whether the particular conduct is governed by specific
constitutional language. An injured bystander would have no claim under section
1983 if injured by an officer's negligent driving during routine patrol, just as a city
employee has no claim under section 1983 if injured after being routinely assigned
to perform a dangerous task. However, a city employee would have a section 1983
claim if he or she were assigned to a dangerous task in retaliation for protected
speech, because the supervisor's decision to retaliate violates the First Amendment.
Under the same principle, an injured motorist would have a claim under section
1983 if the injury was caused by an officer's use of excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment doctrine could provide factual standards to measure the
wisdom and execution of a police response. Whether the victims are suspects,
targets, or bystanders, the test would be "one of 'objective reasonableness' under
the circumstances. "2' Under the objective reasonableness test, there would be no
conflict between the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process limits on
police use of force. There would be no need to anticipate the many ways the
substantive due process claim could diverge from the rest of section 1983 doctrine.
However, bystanders would face a difficult burden of proof because qualified
immunity protects officers against suit unless the plaintiff proves the officer was
"plainly incompetent" or "knowingly violate[d] the law." 21 However, the
importance of the Fourth Amendment right is not limited to damage claims against
individual officers. Of equal or greater importance is the duty of police departments
to select, train, equip, and supervise their officers to properly respond and not
violate the constitutional rights of suspects or the public, a topic examined in the
next section.
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IV. POLICE DEPARTMENT LIABILITY TO BYSTANDERS
The first round of circuit court opinions involved section 1983 suits by
bystanders against individual officers. As bystanders widened the list of defendants,
the circuits have recently considered claims by injured bystanders against the
employers of the officers. Injured bystanders seeking damages from the city or a
police department must prove the two elements of a deprivation of a constitutional
right and action under color of state law. They must also prove that the injury was
caused by the entity's official policy or custom.2" None of the cases has involved
the unlikely scenario of an explicit police department policy of injuring bystanders.
However, an entity will also be liable if its policymakers were deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of the people its police officers would
encounter in their service.29 Some circuit court decisions have suggested that
bystanders can recover damages from an entity under this deliberate indifference
standard even if their evidence is insufficient to establish a substantive due process
violation by the officer. Their conclusion provides another reason to reexamine the
original assumption that bystander rights should be based on substantive due
process.
A. Basic Doctrine on Entity Liability
Monroe v. Pape'9 marks the modem revival of section 1983 litigation, but only
for claims against individual officers. 2' It did not permit a claim to be asserted
against the City of Chicago. 298 Seventeen years later in Monell v. Department of
Social Services.29 municipalities lost their immunity when the Court held that the
governmental entity employing a state actor could be liable under section 1983
when the "execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury. "I

Monell itself did not have to define how to identify the kind of policy that would
create liability because the rule challenged by plaintiffs had concededly been the
official policy of New York City. However, the Court did explicitly declare that "a
local government may not be sued under section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents,"3°' and held that the tort theory of respondeat superior
was not available to plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court began to explore alternative theories of liability in Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle,' in which a plaintiff alleged that a city policy had caused the officer
to shoot an unarmed robbery suspect.303 The plaintiff did not claim that the city had
a rule instructing its officers to shoot unarmed robbery suspects. Instead, the
plaintiff claimed that the city's inadequate training or supervision of the officer
caused the shooting. The jury instructions stipulated that the jury could infer
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inadequate training or supervision from one incident of excessive force. The jury
did so and returned a plaintiff's verdict for $1,500,000. The Supreme Court held
that the jury instructions were erroneous, because permitting the jury to find an
unconstitutional policy on the basis of a single incident would destroy Monell's
holding that entity liability must be based on an official policy. While the opinion
expressed doubt that a city could have a "policy" of "inadequate training," it did
not reject the possibility.3 °" Instead, it required more direct proof that the city
deliberately chose an inadequate policy.
The standard for holding an entity liable for failing to train its employees was
further refined in Canton v. Harris.' In Canton, the plaintiff had been arrested and
held in custody for about an hour without receiving medical treatment after she
slumped to the floor during processing. ' The evidence showed that the shift
commander at the jail could have called for medical assistance, but he had not
received any special training on when to do so. The Court held that the jury verdict
for the plaintiff had to be set aside because the jury instructions did not properly
define the standard for liability. The Court held that inadequate training would
create liability under section 1983 only if the failure to train amounted to
"deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact."I The Court specifically rejected the city's argument that it should limit
liability to cases in which a policy was unconstitutional on its face and the contrary
argument that it should impose liability whenever a valid policy was applied in an
unconstitutional manner. a3
Canton focused on the standard that should be used to test the fault of those who
made the policy for the entity, but the opinion makes clear that the deliberate
indifference phrase is only a partial description of what a plaintiff must prove. The
opinion stressed, more than once, that the standard requires conduct that was
deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The need for training
was described as depending on whether failure to train would likely "result in the
violation of constitutional rights, "31 or whether the police "so often violate
constitutional rights" that the need for training is obvious.31 ° Canton did not
mention that there could be entity liability under section 1983 if the policymakers
were deliberately indifferent to tortious injuries that were not caused by a
constitutional violation.
The requirement that a plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's constitutional right was essential to keep Canton consistent with the
Court's opinion31a week earlier in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services. ' DeShaney held that a plaintiff could not recover damages under
section 1983 for injuries from private violence if the government did not have a
constitutional duty to provide protection against that violence. Even if "the State
304.
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may have been aware of the dangers," there was no duty to protect a child who was
not in state custody.31 2 The Court's opinion did not need to address the state of
mind issue at all. If knowingly allowing someone to be injured by private violence
does not create liability without a separate constitutional duty of protection, then the
less culpable standard of deliberate indifference to a risk of injury from private
conduct will not create a constitutional violation.
Both the language and result in Collins further emphasize that deliberate
indifference alone will not suffice without a constitutional violation. The language
of Collins emphasized that Canton had assumed the existence of a constitutional
right to medical care while in police custody in order to focus on the issue of
municipal responsibility."' The Collins opinion was explicit that it "did not suggest
that all harm-causing municipal policies are actionable under § 1983, or that all
such policies are unconstitutional. "314 The lengthy exploration of substantive due
process was necessary because the plaintiff could not identify any other
constitutional duty for which the city might have been deliberately indifferent.
While state tort law established the city's duty to train its employees or warn them
of dangers, it did not create a constitutional duty.3" 5 The opinion never discussed
what the city policymakers knew or ignored when they defined the city's training
policy. Without a constitutional duty there was no need to ask if there was
deliberate indifference because there still would not be a basis for holding the entity
liable.
The Court's recent decision on the proper interpretation of deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment illustrates the need to use care with the
same phrase when addressing entity liability. Under the Eighth Amendment, the
deliberate indifference standard is an element of a prisoner's claim for damages
caused by inhumane conditions of confinement or inadequate medical care. 1 6 In
Farmer v. Brennan31 7 the Court clearly rejected any application of Canton's
interpretation of the same words to the Eighth Amendment context.3"' However, the
opinion then quoted both the Collins reference to "constitutional torts committed
by its inadequately trained agents"319 and, summarized Canton as "permitting
liability when a municipality disregards 'obvious' needs. 320 If that latter summary
were accurate, it would broaden the Canton rule tremendously by going far beyond
constitutional rights. The discussion of entity liability was dictum because the
opinion in Farmerfocussed on the different application of the same language under
the Eighth Amendment test. Rather than a new interpretation of Canton, the Farmer
opinion is evidence of how easy it is to misdescribe the Canton holding.
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Bryan County v. Brown321 is the most recent example of how even the Supreme
Court may not always summarize Canton accurately. The issue in Bryan County
was whether the County could be liable for injuries a deputy inflicted in making an
arrest using excessive force."2 The plaintiff alleged that the sheriff had hired the
deputy without an adequate investigation. The county stipulated that the sheriff was
the sheriffs department policymaker but argued that the error in hiring the deputy
was not caused by county policy. To distinguish Canton the majority explained why
there might be a difference between an inadequate training program and a faulty
hiring process for a single deputy:
If a program does not prevent constitutionalviolations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for. Their
continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed
to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard
for the consequences of their action-the "deliberate indifference"- necessary
to trigger municipal liability. ("It could ...be that the police, in exercising
their discretion, so often violate constitutionalrights that the need for further
training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers") ...In
addition, the existence of a pattern of tortiousconduct by inadequately trained
employees may show that the lack of proper training... is the "moving force"
behind the plaintiffs injury."u
The opinion noted as well that the "Court of Appeals also posited that Sheriff
Moore's decision reflected indifference to 'the public's welfare.'" 3 24 However,
when the majority opinion moved to the application of the deliberate indifference
test, the intermingling of "tortious conduct" and "constitutional rights" came to an
end and the public welfare did not remain on the table as an element. 3' The opinion
is clear:
A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate
indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutionalor statutory
right will follow the decision.'

The fact that Burns had pleaded guilty to traffic offenses and other misdemeanors may well have made him an extremely poor candidate for reserve
deputy. Had Sheriff Moore fully reviewed Bums' record, he might have come
to precisely that conclusion. But unless he would necessarily have reached that
decision because Burns' use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision, Sheriff Moore's inadequate scrutiny of
Burns' record cannot constitute "deliberate indifference" to respondent's
federally protected right to be free from a use of excessive force.'
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Justice Souter argued in his dissenting opinion that the majority had gone too far
by requiring that the risk of a particular constitutional violation be plainly obvious
and by being so skeptical of plaintiff's proof. However, his opinion likewise
assumed that liability required deliberate indifference to the "substantial risk of a
constitutional violation, " 3 and concluded that there was evidence of the sheriff's
"contempt for constitutional obligations." 3" Justice Breyer in his dissent argued that
the Court should reexamine the rule of Monell and Canton and abandon the effort
to define municipal liability under the policy test," ° but his opinion did not suggest
that a municipality would be liable without a constitutional violation.
B.

DepartmentalLiability under Substantive Due Process
Both the Third Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have tried to define the elements of
a sufficient claim by a bystander against the police department in a way that cannot
be described as a straightforward combination of deliberate indifference to the
substantive due process rights of bystanders. In each case, the circuit court opinion
made a simple change in the standard by requiring deliberate indifference to
something other than a constitutional right. For convenience, this section describes
entity liability as department liability. Perhaps, in most cases, that is a misnomer
because the local police department is actually an administrative unit of government
rather than a separate entity with capacity to be sued, but that is a technical issue.
The focus in each case will always be on the policy decisions made by the
departmental leadership.
1. Departmental Liability in the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit's definition of a sufficient claim against a city can be described
as either an incorrect application of the holding in Canton or an outright revision
of that holding. The original panel opinion had held that the standard of liability for
a bystander's claim against the individual officer is "whether a pursuing police
officer acted with a reckless indifference to public safety." 33
"' The original panel had
reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the officers, because the
trial judge had erred by using the "shocks the conscience" standard.332 The original
panel opinion had also reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
city, which had been based on the finding that the officers had not violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.333 Since the reversal of the summary judgment on
the claim against the officers reopened the possibility that the plaintiff could show
a constitutional violation, it would have been appropriate to reverse the summary
judgment for the city as well. However, besides doing that, the original panel
opinion reached another issue that might have arisen on remand.
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As the original panel opinion stated the issue, it addressed "whether a
municipality can be held independently liable under section 1983 in a police pursuit
case if none of the pursuing officers are liable." 33 The opinion described an
example of a situation in which an untrained officer used force that would be found
excessive if the officer acted with reckless indifference, but the untrained officer
did not know that the actual response was so dangerous.335 Under the same facts a
city could have acted with deliberate indifference, if its policymakers knew of the
danger but chose a policy of inadequate training regarding that particular
response.336 The different factors are time and knowledge. The claim against the
officer depends on what the officer knew at the time of the encounter and the claim
against the city depends on what the department leaders knew about the likelihood
and risks of such encounters at the time they made the department's policy. The
original panel opinion declined to resolve how "reckless indifference" and
"deliberate indifference" might differ,337 but it did emphasize that on remand "the
district court must still consider whether the City violated the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights independently of any individual officer's liability." 3
The en banc opinion noted that the full court review was limited to the question
of the appropriate standard for deciding whether a pursuit violated substantive due
process.339 On that issue the en banc court's rejection of the reckless indifference
standard and adoption of the "shocks the conscience" standard changed the outcome
for the claims against the officers. The en banc court was not shocked by the
conduct of any of the officers, so the summary judgment for the officers was
affirmed. The en banc court did no more with the original panel's decision on the
claim against the city, and allowed the original panel opinion to be "edited to
conform to the new in banc result."' Since the panel opinion had reversed the
denial of summary judgment and held that there could be a claim against the city,
the en banc opinion supports the panel holding that a city can be liable for failing
to provide adequate training for its officers, even if the officers' actual conduct did
not shock the conscience of the court.
In its second opinion, the panel again affirmed that a plaintiff might be able to
prove that the city had violated the Constitution even though none of the individual
officers had done so." Once again the opinion distinguished the improperly trained
officer who escaped liability out of ignorance of the danger from a city that should
be liable if its policymakers knew of the danger but refused to provide training. 2
However, the en banc holding that bystanders are protected only by a substantive
due process right against conduct that "shocks the conscience" made it well nigh
impossible for a city's training policy to be the result of deliberate indifference to
such a limited constitutional right. The language of the en banc opinion had
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suggested a substantive due process violation would involve "malicious abuse of
official power""' or "outrageous conduct" 3 " or "arbitrary use of government
power."345 In contrast, there would be no constitutional claim where the injury was
"incidental and unintended consequence of official action."" A training program
that prepared officers to refrain from acting in a malicious, outrageous, or arbitrary
manner would not have to consider the dangers of responses the officers might elect
to make in good faith, even when the department knew that the unintended
consequences of certain responses were much more dangerous than the untrained
officer would know.
The panel in its second opinion included the element of deliberate indifference,
but its principal declaration of the claim against the city did not require deliberate
indifference toward the constitutional rights of bystanders:
The City is liable under section 1983 if its policynakers, acting with deliberate
indifference, implemented a policy of inadequate training and thereby caused
the officers to conduct the pursuit in an unsafe manner and deprive the
plaintiffs of life or liberty .... I
We hold that a municipality can be liable under section 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment for a failure to train its police officers with respect to high-speed
automobile chases, even if no individual officer participating in the chase
violated the Constitution.'
While there is also one reference in the opinion to "a city policy reflecting the
city policymakers' deliberate indifference to constitutional rights," 9 the entire
context of the opinion suggests that the court was defining a substantive due process
claim for deliberate indifference to the danger of pursuit, not deliberate indifference
to the constitutional right against conduct that shocks the conscience of the court.
In principle, it can be argued that the Third Circuit is not clearly wrong. As a
question of precedent it must be admitted that the Supreme Court has not closed the
roll of viable substantive due process claims. In reality, such a claim would be
completely contrary to the Court's often repeated cautions against defining new
substantive due process rights and in direct conflict with Canton's holding that a
plaintiff can recover under section 1983 if policymakers are deliberately indifferent
to the constitutional rights of those its employees will encounter. Most seriously,
it parses Canton's holding into an incomplete and partial standard by omitting any
mention of the subject toward which the policymakers must have been deliberately
indifferent.
In the end, the Third Circuit's version of municipal liability did not help the
plaintiffs enough to make a difference at trial. The jury returned a defense verdict,
one day after the plaintiffs declined a settlement offer of more than $1.6 million.350
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2. Departmental Liability in the Tenth Circuit
A more recent decision of the Tenth Circuit used a similar approach in defining
entity liability. In Williams v. Denver35' a motorist was hit and killed by a police
officer who was responding to a nonemergency call for assistance. 33 2 The cause of
the collision was bad driving by the officer, who decided to "speed against a red
light through an intersection on a major boulevard in Denver without slowing down
or activating his siren in non-emergency circumstances. "" Those facts differed
from a typical pursuit case like Fagan because no suspect was involved in any way
with the collision, but the Tenth Circuit addressed the same question of defining
entity liability when the plaintiff asserts a substantive due process claim against the
officer.
The court set the stage for its discussion of the city's liability by holding that
there was enough evidence to support a substantive due process claim against the
individual officer because his bad driving "could be viewed as reckless and
conscience-shocking." 3I The court then held that this result required reversing the
city's summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that it failed to train the officer.355
The discussion began with a quotation from Canton:
The Supreme Court has held that a City is liable on a "failure to train" claim
when "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy
so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy makers
of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need. "[9]3 s
9. The Court made clear in City of Canton that a City is liable for its deliberate
indifference to the unconstitutional conduct of its employees regardless of the
degree of fault a plaintiff must show to establish the underlying claim of
constitutional violation. 3
The court then briefly discussed only the evidence that might have made the need
for training obvious-a poor driving record when the officer was hired, poor driving after the officer was hired, and a common practice by City officers of responding improperly to emergency calls358-and reversed. A key issue framed by the
quotation from Canton was left untouched, with no discussion of whether the failure
to train was likely to result in a constitutional violation. By allowing that issue to
drop away without mention, the opinion laid the groundwork for finding entity
liability when the need to train is made obvious because of the risk of injury alone.
The precedential value of Williams was undercut when the Tenth Circuit vacated
the panel opinion and granted rehearing en banc. 9 It is not clear if the reason was
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the panel's adoption of the conscience shocking standard, its application of the
conscience shocking standard to the conduct of the officer, or its reversal of the
summary judgment for the City on the failure to train claim. The dissenting opinion
from the panel decision objected only to its discussion of the claim against the
officer. 3' 6
C.

Where was the Detour?
The endpoint of this reconstruction of the substantive due process standard by
the Third and Tenth Circuits stands out in stark contrast with the basic tenet that
section 1983 liability depends on the department's deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights. There were several key decision points on the path to this
endpoint-the assumption that bystander rights should be based on substantive due
process, the conclusion that the substantive due process standard should be defined
as conduct that "shocks the conscience," and the assumption that bystanders should
have a section 1983 claim if the police department policymakers knew but did not
care that officers in the department were not prepared to respond to criminal
activity without creating greater dangers. The remaining question is which decision
or decisions led to the wrong conclusion.
The last decision on the path does not appear to be the reason for the detour. The
doctrine derived from Monell and Canton, that the department can be liable if its
policymaking leadership was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations
committed by untrained or unsupervised officers, is still good law. Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg have now joined Justice Stevens in arguing for reexamination of
Monell's basic distinction, but they have emphasized expansion of municipal
liability and not contraction.361 Other circuit courts have declined to follow the lead
of the Third Circuit, but they have done so because they thought "the Faganpanel
ignored... the requirement that the plaintiffs harm be caused by a constitutional
violation, "' not because they saw any reason to doubt that deliberate indifference
is a required element.
The second decision on the path is one apparent reason for the detour. The
conscience shocking standard had been described as so difficult to meet that
combining deliberate indifference with that standard would seem to impose no duty
at all on the policymakers. In contrast, the Lewis opinion shows that a different
decision at this point could have avoided producing that empty set. The Ninth
Circuit's decision to define the standard as deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard for life produced a combination that would produce some meaningful
content for the duty of the policymakers. In Lewis itself the factual record undercut
the plaintiff's case because the department had a training program and a pursuit
policy, but the court suggested it might not have affirmed the defense summary
judgment if plaintiff had evidence of a "program-wide inadequacy in training."363
An additional indication that the Lewis standard could produce a workable measure
June 26, 1997).
360. See Williams, 99 F.3d at 1021-25 (Anderson, J., dissenting in part).
361.
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363. Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 447 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997).
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for judging the decisions of policymakers is the similarity to Canton itself, where
the underlying constitutional right was the Eighth Amendment right to medical
treatment that is violated when a jailer shows deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. 3" However, the possibility that the Lewis standard would provide
a measure for entity liability does not necessarily mean that the second decision
point was the root cause of the detour.
The first decision on the path is also a possible reason for the detour, because the
problem in defining the basis for entity liability may be only the initial example of
a more general flaw in any effort to define bystander rights under substantive due
process. The very nature of the uncharted scope of substantive due process that
made it seem so available for bystander rights may also explain why bystanders
have fared so badly under it. The absence of an organized body of precedent under
a specific textual right leads to ad hoc decisions that ignore the guidance to be
gained on closely related issues. The next section sketches some of the differences
a Fourth Amendment foundation could make in order to illustrate why the root
cause of the detour should be identified as the choice of substantive due process as
the starting point.
V.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE THE FOUNDATION MAKES

A.

Meeting the Emphasis on the Foundation
The 1997 decision in United States v. Lanier provides a current reminder of
the Supreme Court's continued emphasis on the importance of building the structure
of constitutional rights on a solid foundation. In this case the Court reviewed the
criminal conviction of a Tennessee judge who had been charged with violating the
constitutional rights of five women by various acts of sexual assault.3a The jury
instructions had defined sexual assault as being a constitutional crime when the
conduct was "so demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock
one's consci[ence]."3 The Sixth Circuit had reversed the conviction on the ground
that a constitutional right could not be used to support a criminal conviction unless
the right had been clearly established by Supreme Court decisions in a factually
similar case. 3" The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation as too narrow and
held that the constitutional right could be established by lower court decisions as
well, and that fair warning could come from earlier decisions that were not always
factually identical."a The Court then remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit."7 °
The Lanier opinion did not directly address one difficult task it left for the Sixth
Circuit on remand. The prior Sixth Circuit decision was explicitly limited to the
theory that the offense should be "defined as 'interference with bodily integrity that
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shocks the conscience of the court and the jury.'" 371 However, the Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion did not discuss whether there actually is a substantive due
process right or whether the conscience shocking standard provides the proper
measure. The only guidance the Court provided was a concluding footnote that
expressly rejected certain arguments about DeShaney and Graham:
[A]lthough [Deshaney] generally limits the constitutional duty of officials to
protect against assault by private parties to cases where the victim is in
custody, DeShaney does not hold.., that there is no constitutional right to be
free from assault committed by state officials themselves outside of a custodial
setting.... [Graham] does not hold that all constitutional claims relating to
physically abusive government conduct must arise under the Fourth or Eighth
Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. 372
The importance of this footnote extends beyond the tacit confirmation that the
Court has not yet declared the scope of the substantive due process right to be
exhausted. A more important message of this footnote becomes clearer if it is read
in light of the oral argument.373 The questions from the Justices explored whether
different outcomes might make "every arrest ...a Federal case, " 31 or make "any
physical tort committed by a State agent in the course of his employment . . . a
constitutional violation," 375 or whether "any violent assault by a public official, any
at all, against a free person as opposed to someone who is in custody" 376 would
violate a constitutional right. The questions at oral argument were consistent with
the Court's earlier cautions that substantive due process rights are disfavored
because they cannot be well defined and lack clear outer boundaries. The footnote
is also a reminder that the lower courts may not need to invoke substantive due
process if they read the Court's decisions carefully and do not overlook how
explicit rights can provide a foundation.
The same emphasis on building an initial foundation supports using the Fourth
Amendment to define the constitutional rights of bystanders. The basic standard for
measuring whether the force is excessive was already developed by the decisions
in Garner,Graham, and Brower. The context in which the excessive force standard
applies was defined in Graham as including "the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other 'seizure'". a7 Using that standard for bystanders would not expand
the constitutional limits on the police. In fact, it would cut the number of limits in
half by making all decisions about the appropriate amount of force to use in a
response subject to only the Fourth Amendment instead of both the Fourth
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Amendment and substantive due process. The Court has emphasized that multiple
sources of constitutional rights are possible where each is based on an "explicit
textual source" and that there is no reason to pick which of two explicit sources is
"dominant."3 78 However, substantive due process is not based on an explicit textual
source. The "more generalized notion" of substantive due process has not been
used by the Court when an explicit textual source "targeted the same sort of
governmental conduct. "379
The wide variation in state tort law on police liability to injured bystanders cuts
both ways on the question of the constitutional rights of bystanders. The fact that
many states have tort standards at least as favorable to bystanders suggests that the
constitutional claim will be unnecessary in some states .3 The rapidly growing body
of state tort decisions is evidence that state courts and legislatures have not ignored
the issue, even if they have reached differing conclusions on the best policy. 381 On
the other hand, the tort law variance for bystander victims resembles the situation
for the use of deadly force the Court considered in Garner.382 Using a Fourth
Amendment foundation would have the same effect for bystanders as Garnerhad
for suspects by establishing the constitutional right as a minimum standard of
protection for bystanders in every state. Just as for suspects, it would be only a
minimum. States would still be free to provide greater compensation through tort
law or to protect police officers and departments from any further liability.
A Fourth Amendment foundation would make more evident the constitutional
implications of some police practices. A subtle theme that has accompanied the
search for a substantive due process answer has been that the courts must choose
between constitutional rights for bystanders or effective law enforcement and that
it is not possible to have both. The Sixth Circuit opinion in Galas v. McKee38 3 has
both typified the judicial response to the substantive due process claim and been one
of the baseline decisions in its development. The Galas decision has always carried
added authority as precedent on this topic because Justice Scalia used the Galas
result in his Brower opinion to illustrate his statement that there is no
unconstitutional seizure when a pursued suspect "unexpectedly loses control of his
car and crashes. "34 The apparent imprimatur of this pedigree may explain why the
circuits have so often assumed that a substantive due process claim requires a police
response more shocking than the facts in Galas.
In Galas, the seriously injured plaintiff was the fleeing driver, not a bystander.
At the time of the chase he was 13 years old. The chase started when an officer saw
him speeding at 65-70 miles per hour; the chase reached over 100 miles per hour

378. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1993); Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992).
379. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70.
380. See, e.g., City of Pinellas Parkv. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1992); Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121 (Md.
Ct. App. 1991); Jones v. Ahlberg, 489 N.w.2d 576 (N.D. 1992); Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 550 N.W.2d 103 (Wis.

1996).
381. See, e.g., Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995); Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992);
Tice v. Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090 (N.J. 1993); Colby v. Boyden, 400 S.E.2d 184 (Va. 1991).
382. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
383. 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986).
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and continued until it ended with a wreck. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit divided the
question into two parts inorder to apply the holding in Garner and stated two
conclusions-that there was no seizure because the suspect was fleeing until he
disabled himself, and that the pursuit was reasonable. 3" The holding that the pursuit
was reasonable did not depend on any facts specific to the actual case, but rather
on a declaration about a proposition of law: "[W]e conclude that the use of highspeed pursuits by police officers is not an unreasonable method of seizing traffic

violators. "386
This declaration that pursuit is not unreasonable became embedded in the
substantive due process standard for bystander claims. The Sixth Circuit in Jones
38 7 declared that the Galas holding that "high-speed pursuit is a
v. Sherrill1
constitutionally permissible method of apprehending traffic offenders" was equally
388
applicable to a case involving the constitutional rights of "an innocent bystander."
Other circuit courts used Jones as a comparator when they presented examples of
conduct that did not shock the conscience and declared that the facts of the case
before the court were not as bad as in those other cases.389 That in turn explains
why later courts have confidently declared that police chases are "a necessary
concomitant of maintaining order in our modern society. "' In the unstructured and
formless world of substantive due process, the lower courts found no other
standard. The courts feared that any liability could "hamstring the police in their
performance of vital duties"3 9 1 and concluded that the judiciary should not intrude
in law enforcement decisions.
The focus on substantive due process obscured the significance of the Supreme
Court's response to very similar arguments in Fourth Amendment cases. Before
Garner, a suspect did not have a constitutional right to be free from excessive
force; there could be no civil rights claim even if the officer used deadly force to
stop a fleeing suspect who was not dangerous. In Garner, the defendants argued
that the Court should not recognize a constitutional right, because "overall violence
will be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who know that
they may be shot if they flee." 3°9The Court was not persuaded by this argument
and did not leave the decision to use deadly force entirely to the police officer's
discretion. Capturing a suspect at all costs was constitutionally unreasonable. It was
"unfortunate" if some suspects escaped, 3" but the chance of that happening did not
always justify deadly force.
At the same time, Garnerdid not specifically forbid the use of deadly force. The
Court did not attempt to declare a global rule either forbidding all deadly force or

385. See Galas, 801 F.2d at 202-03.
386. Id. at 203.
387. 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987).
388. Id. at 1106.
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1038-39 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Fagan and Jones).
390. Evans, 100 F.3d at 1038.
391. Id.
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permitting it without the possibility of judicial review. The conditions for the use
of deadly force were factual-the nature of the crime, the presence of a weapon,
the threat to the officer or others, the alternatives to prevent escape, and the
feasibility of a warning."a When the Court held that there could be a Fourth
Amendment violation if the police used a roadblock to stop a fleeing driver, the
opinion likewise emphasized the need to examine the "character" and
"circumstances" of the actual roadblock. 3"
The whole body of circuit court decisions on bystander rights is notable for
scarcely mentioning that there might be a factual dispute for trial about the wisdom
or the execution of the police response. One early district court opinion reflects the
general tenor with its assertion that "a pursuit is not deadly force" and, while
fleeing felons cannot always be shot, that does not mean that it is "unreasonable to
try to catch every one of them. "' This attitude may be all but inevitable since the
dominant fact in every case will be the wrongdoing of the suspect. The suspect's
conduct will so clearly be a but-for cause of the tragedy that the officer's response
will appear to be at least a good faith attempt to enforce the law. The judicial
frustration with the suspect's criminal conduct then leads the court to assign all fault
to the suspect and none to the officers. An explicit Fourth Amendment foundation
would provide a foundation for addressing whether the response was excessive,
even when the police were acting in good faith to combat crime or apprehend a
suspect.
B.

The Foundationand DepartmentalLiability
Most of the circuit court opinions apply the substantive due process standard with
a consistent judicial acceptance of pursuit as so "necessary" that the courts should
almost never question the way the police struck "the balance between law
enforcement and risk to public safety. "3 What has been notably missing from these
opinions is the recognition of the inevitability of danger to bystanders during
pursuit. The wisdom of pursuit has been examined in critical studies 398 and debated
in law enforcement literature. 39 Various reasons for imposing greater controls on
individual officers during a pursuit have been examined.' Alternatives to pursuit
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that have been proposed and tested include better tactics for intercepting suspects"'
and better equipment, such as tire puncture devices.' Some police departments
have added extensive training programs in pursuit driving.' One legislative
proposal in Congress sought a federal solution to the dangers of pursuit.' States
such as California have tried to reduce the dangers of pursuit by making the city's
adoption of a pursuit policy a necessary condition for immunity,' and by requiring
that police officers be trained about whether and how to pursue.' There has also
been research on the use of deadly force,' efforts to improve the quality of police
training in the use of deadly force, 8 and efforts to study how the choice of bullet
type affects the safety of all concerned.'
While the literature does support the circuit court recognition that an officer must
often decide how to respond both "quickly and while under considerable
pressure, "4 o it does not support the circuit court focus on only the immediate
moment of the response. An earlier point at which the possible constitutional claim
might make a difference may be when the department makes the policy decisions
that influence the officer's response on the scene. That includes training the officer
on whether and how to respond, establishing a communications system so an officer
is not expected to make decisions that should be made by a supervisor, choosing the
kind of equipment provided to the officer, and investing in other useful forms of
assistance. A single officer with no training and no way to obtain assistance may
see flight as a personal challenge that must be met by nothing short of apprehension
at all costs. An officer with training might avoid the pursuit with a different
response or might be better able to recognize that a particular pursuit is unwise. An
officer with more equipment might be able to avoid a pursuit; a supervisor might
make a more balanced decision; and a department with more officers or resources
might be able to respond more effectively and more safely.41
Recognition that a response might be different if an officer or department had
more resources or used their resources in a different way does not mean that every
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injury to a bystander should be labeled a constitutional violation. However, police
departments and municipal authorities may know there is a risk of injury to
bystanders as well as a risk of injury to suspects and officers. The department has
an obvious self interest in reducing the risk to its officers, and a Fourth Amendment
duty to be concerned about the risk to suspects. In some states, the potential for tort
liability means a department must be concerned about the risk to bystanders, but
tort liability does not exist in some states. In states where there is no available tort
claim, the difference between a Fourth Amendment foundation for bystander claims
and a substantive due process foundation will be significant. Bystanders will be left
to absorb their own losses from being caught in the middle if they have no more
than a symbolic substantive due process claim, even if such injuries could have
been made less likely or less harmful with a different policy decision about how
much money to spend on public safety, how to allocate it, or what to expect officers
to be able to do.
The difference the choice of a constitutional right can make has been illustrated
by decisions that address whether the police department can be held liable if the
officer is not liable. The First Circuit is one of several that has given a negative
answer to that possibility, concluding that "the fact that Avery and Greene did not
violate Evans' constitutional rights means that the City is not liable to her under
section 1983. "412 The Third Circuit gave an affirmative answer when it held "an
underlying constitutional tort can still exist even if no individual police officer
violated the Constitution."4" 3 The Third Circuit answer may be flawed because it
allowed the need for a constitutional right to drop out of the analysis entirely. That
does not mean there was a flaw in considering more than the immediate moment of
the incident and resisting the assumption that good faith pursuit is never
unreasonable because apprehension is always worth the cost. This approach is the
first step in determining when the department could be liable, but not the officer,
under the same definition of a constitutional right. However, the value of the
approach was obscured by the reconstruction of the substantive due process claim.
Fourth Amendment decisions provide a different starting point.
An opinion from the Ninth Circuit provides an illustrative set of facts involving
a Fourth Amendment claim brought on behalf of a person who was shot and killed
by a police officer." 4 The officer who responded to a disturbance call had found
and searched the suspect.4"" The officer knew that the suspect was acting strangely
but also knew the suspect was unarmed, so the officer let him leave. When the
officer saw the suspect acting strangely a second time the officer again made
contact. In this second contact the suspect approached the officer in a threatening
way, so the officer used his baton to strike him and keep him away. This action was
unsuccessful, either because the suspect grabbed the baton and began beating the
officer or because the officer fell or was pushed backward. The officer decided to
shoot, and hit the suspect 6 times. The wounded suspect continued to attack, but the
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officer was able to radio for help, reload, and hide across the street. When the
suspect continued to advance, the officer fired four more shots and killed him.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the defense summary judgment on the claim against
the officer; it concluded there were sufficient facts to support the allegation that at
least the last four shots were excessive. In addition, the court reversed the summary
judgment for the defense on the claim against the city. The court held that there
might also be a claim against the city even if the officer's use of force was
reasonable to protect himself from the suspect's continued attack.
In any event, the police chief and city might be held liable for improper
training or improper procedure even if Andaya is exonerated, since they put an
officer on the street who is so badly trained and instructed he lets his baton be
taken away from him and then has to kill an unarmed civilian to save his own
life. Andaya has a history of citizen complaints of excessive force, a reputation
for being quick-tempered, and has drawn or fired his gun inappropriately
several times before. These facts would certainly bear on whether the city
properly trained Andaya, and whether they should have sent him out on the
streets carrying a weapon.4" 6
An opinion from the Tenth Circuit also illustrates how Fourth Amendment rights
of suspects affect the police department's duty to provide training. In Zuchel v. City
of Denver4 17 the survivors of a suspect shot by a police officer asserted a Fourth
Amendment claim. 1" Once again the facts of the incident began as a minor
disturbance by the suspect. The officer approached the suspect with his gun drawn
and shot him four times when the suspect turned around. The court affirmed a
judgment against the defendants, holding that the evidence supported the jury's
finding that Denver's training in the use of deadly force was inadequate. In support
of its holding it set out the trial testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness on police
training and procedures: "Officer Spinharney handled this just the way any guy on
the street would. He did not handle it as a professional, trained police officer who
had received training on when it was appropriate to shoot and when it was
appropriate not to shoot would have handled this situation."419
The Tenth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding
that the police department was deliberately indifferent to the Fourth Amendment
rights of suspects because it had made no effort to improve its training program.
The evidence that they should have improved training included a letter from the
district attorney two and a half years prior to the accident that had pointed out the
high number of deadly force incidents and had recommended live training for
officers on shoot-don't shoot situations and had warned the police chief that the
officers were not prepared "to analyze situations, develop options, and select the
option that minimizes the likelihood of a violent confrontation."' The plaintiffs
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expert on police training, tactics, and the use of deadly force testified that the city's
training program was "far below generally accepted police custom and practice. " 421
An injured bystander, on the same facts, would have a much harder or even
impossible case because a similar discussion of expert testimony comparing the
particular response of an untrained officer with a professional, trained police officer
has been notably absent from the circuit court opinions on bystander rights. Even
if a professional, trained officer would not shoot or pursue, expert opinion might
seem irrelevant under a conscience shocking standard for substantive due process
if the measure depends only on what the judges find shocking. As commentators
have noted, the general public's attitude toward deadly force and pursuit is strongly
colored by television and movie portrayals. 4' The dramatic license that adds a good
chase scene to every show may subtly affect judicial expectations of what should
be acceptable and what should shock their conscience or otherwise violate
substantive due process. A Fourth Amendment foundation for bystander rights
would measure the department's duty to prepare its officers by the evolving
standards of professional police work and not by an entertainment caricature.
There is substantial evidence that many police departments are trying to reduce
the dangers of pursuits. A recent major study of police pursuits for the National
Institute of Justice found that 91 percent of the responding police agencies had
written pursuit policies.4' Almost half reported that they had modified their policies
in the last two years, mostly by making them more restrictive. 4' Newspaper stories
from various cities likewise report that many police departments have adopted new
policies that give officers more guidance on when and whether to pursue and that
require more control of any pursuit by a supervisor.4' However, even though many
departments are already taking action that would defeat a claim of deliberate
indifference to the rights of bystanders, that does not mean that recognizing the
Fourth Amendment right will have no effect. The National Institute of Justice study
also found departments that had no written policy and many others that were still
following policies that had not changed since the 1970's. It also reported finding
departments that had taken "limited steps to train their officers" and departments
where training on whether to pursue was "minimal or nonexistent.""
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VI. THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY LEWIS
Lewis provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to observe what the
circuit courts have built on the foundation the Court started to develop in 1989 in
Graham and Brower. One clue that it is prepared to do more than pick between the
standards for a substantive due process claim comes from a case it did not accept,
namely Evans. The competing conscience shocking standard was well represented
by the First Circuit opinion in Evans,4"1 but the Court denied certiorari three weeks
before accepting Lewis for review.""
As a preliminary step the Court will have to decide whether the allegations in
Lewis's complaint are sufficient to avoid the fate of the plaintiff in Albright v.
Oliver.429 In Albright, a majority of the Court read a narrowly drawn complaint as
a reason to address only whether there was a substantive due process claim and not
to decide whether the facts would support a Fourth Amendment claim. Albright
should not have the same effect in Lewis because the plaintiff in Albright did not
want to assert a Fourth Amendment claim; Justice Ginsberg suggested in a
concurrence that the plaintiff was concerned that the Fourth Amendment would not
survive a limitations defense.43 In Lewis, the plaintiff followed the consensus in
omitting an explicit Fourth Amendment claim, but did not do so in order to avoid
an affirmative defense. As the Ninth Circuit described the complaint, plaintiff
asserted a violation of "Fourteenth Amendment due process rights," 4 3' and it was
the court that decided which standard to use for measuring whether the defendant's
motion for summary judgment should be granted.
The closer match for the complaint in Lewis appears to be Graham, where the
Court described the complaint as alleging a violation of "rights secured to him
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. "432 The Court read the pleading in Graham as sufficient to state a claim
under the Fourth Amendment. In addition, when the Supreme Court used Eighth
Amendment doctrine to provide a foundation for the constitutional rights of pretrial
detainees it did not hold that detainees actually have only an Eighth Amendment
right. 433 Thus, the Court's past practice on pleading style would seem to support the
conclusion that Lewis has sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim that
can be based on a Fourth Amendment foundation.
The Ninth Circuit opinion provided a succinct explanation of its interpretation
of the Court's decisions in a brief footnote discussion that relied exclusively on
Brower and never mentioned Graham. "It is undisputed that Smith did not intend
to hit Lewis with his patrol car. There was thus no Fourth Amendment violation.
See Brower v. County of Inyo . . . ." However, the facts described in the opinion
make clear that the court was referring only to one part of the officer's intent.
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There seemed to be no question that the officer intended to pursue the motorcycle,
that he pursued it because he intended to seize the driver and passenger, and that
he intentionally used the force at his command to accomplish his goal:
Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to
stop.... The chase was at night, in a residential area, and hit speeds of up to
100 miles per hour. Smith could not have stopped his car within the range of
his headlights. Finally, even though Officer Smith was familiar with the area,
he crested a hill blindly at a speed of about 65 miles per hour.43
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on one part of the officer's intent as the reason to
select substantive due process as the applicable constitutional right tends to obscure
how much the Fourth Amendment controlled the officer's decision about a
response. Garnerand Brower established that the officer would have violated the
Fourth Amendment if he had shot the unarmed driver or passenger to make them
stop or if he had parked his police car where he knew it would force a deadly
crash. The same Fourth Amendment right would have been violated if the officer
had shot wildly in the direction of the driver and passenger and hoped the bullets
would miss, or if the officer aimed his out of control police car in their direction
out of frustration at their refusal to stop. However, the court's focus on a single
part of Brower led the circuit court to the very mistake the Supreme Court warned
against in Brower itself: "[W]e cannot draw too fine a line . . . . We think it
enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in
motion or put in place in order to achieve that result."436
The most important step the Supreme Court can take in Lewis is to reinvigorate
Graham by reaffirming that the Fourth Amendment provides the specific
constitutional standard for judging whether the police used excessive force in the
context of an arrest or investigatory stop. The course or context of an arrest or
seizure should include the whole sequence of events from the start of the response
to the conclusion. This holding by the Court would not mean immediate success for
either party, nor would the decision "determine the future of high-speed police
pursuits" as promised by initial press reports of the grant of certiorari.4 37
Application of what Graham described as the "Fourth Amendment inquiry ... of
'objective reasonableness' under the circumstances"438 requires a much fuller
examination of the facts than the circuit courts have done under substantive due
process and a more extensive factual record than was developed in Lewis before the
grant of summary judgment.
Once the Court holds that an injured passenger, such as Lewis, or a bystander
is protected by a Fourth Amendment right, the lower courts will still have to
address other issues they have not yet examined. Thus far only one circuit court has
given much attention to the element of proximate cause. A majority in Mays v. City

435. Id. at 442.
436. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99.
437. L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at A3; David G. Savage, Justices to Rule on Police Liability in High-Speed
Chases, LAW ENFORCEMENT, available in 1997 WL 2216618.
438. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

of East St. Louis43 9 declared that a bystander's injuries are always "the result of
criminal behavior by a private actor" and that the officer's pursuit may be a cause
"but not the kind of cause the law recognizes as culpable."' Those conclusions
would negate the practical effect of any constitutional right the court could
recognize in Lewis, so it is important to ask if the Seventh Circuit has ended the
debate with a preemptive strike.
There are several reasons this issue is more complicated than suggested by the
Seventh Circuit's opening salvo. The declaration that "the law"" does not
recognize that both the officer's pursuit and the suspect's driving can be a
proximate cause is not true for states that already impose liability on an officer or
department under tort law." 2 If the declaration is only a narrower statement about
liability for constitutional claims after Deshaney,"3 it rests on an untested
assumption that DeShaney applies to both its facts of passive failure to intervene
and the arguably different facts of active involvement in the third party's conduct.
The suggestion that constitutional rights of bystanders should be completely rejected
as "unlikely to promote aggregate social welfare" 4 goes beyond what the Supreme
Court has held. In its latest decision on departmental liability, the Court did not
hold that the department could never be liable. 4 5 The strongest statement from a
five judge majority went only as far as insisting that the courts should "adhere to
rigorous requirements of culpability and causation" and warned that federalism
concerns may be raised if the courts did not "apply stringent culpability and
causation requirements."'
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion rests on the assumption that the courts
face a bipolar choice between either "[z]ealous pursuit or "[flax law enforcement"
and that courts can offer no more than "[e]asy solutions [that] rarely work."" 7 As
the parties litigate what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, their evidence
will describe the standards the law enforcement community itself sets for police
departments and will illustrate what a modem police department can expect from
its officers and how it should properly train, supervise, and equip its officers. This
will build the factual records in these cases that are essential in order to provide
appellate judges with an accurate perspective of which police responses are
8
reasonable and which are not.4
A remand in Lewis for application of the Fourth Amendment would leave for
another day the much broader question of whether there are factual settings where
the Court should recognize a substantive due process claim for conduct that shocks
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the conscience. That is the same issue the Court postponed in the last term in
United States v. Lanier."9 A number of lower court cases have raised that question
in settings as varied as the right of a schoolchild to be free from sexual abuse by a
public school employee, 5 0 the right of a motorist to be free from dangers created
by state actors not involved in law enforcement, 45 t and the right of a child to be
protected by a state agency.452 The number and variety of possible applications
make clear that any attempt to answer a broad question about the viability or scope
of substantive due process will have unforeseen and unpredictable consequences.
The Court would continue its practice of defining constitutional rights in a
manageable structure by doing no more in Lewis than making clear that the Fourth
Amendment applies to all police pursuits.
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